Inaccurate Braden Scoring and Lack of RN Oversight for High-Risk Resident
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure that pressure injury risk assessments met professional standards of quality for a resident with multiple serious medical conditions. The resident was admitted with acute on chronic diastolic congestive heart failure, acute and chronic respiratory failure with hypoxia, pulmonary edema, muscle weakness, gait and mobility abnormalities, difficulty walking, cognitive communication deficit, and dementia. An LPN completed Braden Scale evaluations on two occasions, assigning scores of 16 and 17, which indicated only mild risk for pressure injury development. These Braden assessments documented no sensory impairment, occasional moisture, chairfast status with frequent slight independent position changes, and either inadequate or adequate nutrition, with friction and shear listed as a potential problem. In contrast, other clinical documentation at and shortly after admission described the resident as significantly more impaired. Physical therapy and occupational therapy evaluations identified the resident as dependent with assist of two for bed mobility and sit-to-stand, requiring a mechanical lift (Hoyer) or stander with assist of two for transfers, and ambulation only with therapy. Nursing documentation and an advanced skilled evaluation described the resident as bedfast most of the time, incontinent of urine and bowel, using adult briefs and a bedpan, with +3 pitting edema in all extremities and some open areas requiring ace wraps. The admission MDS documented that the resident was dependent for toileting, bathing, transfers, position changes, and wheelchair mobility, frequently incontinent of bowel and bladder, and at risk for pressure ulcers/injuries. Based on these records, the surveyor’s Braden scoring using the same tool yielded a significantly lower score, indicating high risk for pressure injury development. The facility also failed to ensure that Braden assessments completed by an LPN were reviewed by an RN, despite state scope-of-practice requirements that LPNs contribute to, but not independently perform, nursing assessments. The DNS and RN supervisor confirmed that Braden scales were completed and locked by the LPN without RN co-signature or review, and that the RN supervisor did not review LPN documentation for accuracy or consistency. The ADNS later acknowledged that the Braden assessments for this resident were not accurate, that the score should have been lower, and that there were inconsistencies and conflicting documentation in the clinical record. The facility’s own policy required licensed nurses to conduct Braden risk assessments on admission, weekly for four weeks, then quarterly or with significant change, and the ADNS stated that the Braden score directs interventions for pressure injury prevention. However, the resident’s care plan carried over prior interventions that did not reflect current PT recommendations for mechanical lift transfers and assist of two for bed mobility, and the resident was provided only a pressure-reducing mattress rather than an overlay or air mattress, further illustrating the disconnect between the resident’s documented condition and the Braden assessments used to guide care. Additionally, the resident’s care plan for self-care deficit and skin integrity risk did not accurately incorporate the updated functional status and transfer needs identified by therapy. The care plan continued to direct assist of one for bed mobility and transfers and described the resident as non-ambulatory based on prior admission information, failing to reflect the current requirement for mechanical lift transfers with assist of two. While the care plan for skin integrity risk included general interventions such as keeping skin clean and dry, providing a pressure-relieving/reducing mattress, frequent turning and repositioning, and encouraging nutrition and hydration, it did not appear to be driven by an accurate Braden risk level. Interviews with nursing leadership confirmed that Braden assessments were not being reviewed or co-signed by an RN when completed by an LPN, and that the facility relied on these unreviewed scores to direct pressure injury prevention interventions for this high-risk resident. The CT LPN Practice Act and state statute cited in the report specify that LPNs may participate in all phases of the nursing process under the direction of an RN and may collect, report, and record data, but cannot independently perform the nursing assessment. Despite this, the DNS and RN supervisor stated that Braden scales were considered evaluations rather than assessments and therefore did not require RN review or co-signature. This practice resulted in inaccurate Braden scoring for a resident with significant mobility, continence, and edema issues, and the ADNS ultimately agreed that the Braden assessments did not accurately reflect the resident’s status and that the resident’s risk for pressure injury development was greater than documented. The combination of inaccurate Braden scoring, lack of RN oversight of LPN-completed assessments, and care plans that did not align with current therapy and nursing findings led to the identified deficiency in ensuring services met professional standards of quality. The facility’s own policy for pressure injury prevention and management required licensed nurses to conduct Braden risk assessments at specified intervals and with significant changes in condition, but the implementation of this policy did not include RN validation of LPN-completed Braden tools. Interviews showed that leadership staff were either unable or unwilling to confirm the accuracy of the resident’s initial Braden scores at the time of survey, and only upon further review did the ADNS acknowledge that the scores were inaccurate and should have been lower. The surveyor’s independent Braden scoring, based on the admission assessment, PT and OT assessments, and nursing notes, demonstrated that the resident’s true risk level was high, underscoring the discrepancy between the facility’s documented Braden scores and the resident’s actual clinical condition as recorded elsewhere in the chart. Overall, the deficiency centers on the facility’s failure to ensure that Braden pressure injury risk assessments were accurate, consistent with other clinical documentation, and performed within the appropriate scope of practice, as well as the failure to ensure RN oversight of LPN-completed Braden tools. This resulted in care planning and interventions that were not properly aligned with the resident’s actual risk for pressure injury development, as evidenced by conflicting documentation regarding mobility, continence, edema, and skin status, and by leadership’s acknowledgment that the Braden scores were not accurate and that the resident’s risk was greater than documented.
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