Jonesboro Rehab & Hcc
Inspection history, citations, penalties and survey trends for this long-term care facility in Jonesboro, Illinois.
- Location
- 995 State Rt 127, Jonesboro, Illinois 62952
- CMS Provider Number
- 145905
- Inspections on file
- 10
- Latest survey
- November 20, 2024
- Citations (last 12 mo.)
- 0
Citation history
Health deficiencies cited at Jonesboro Rehab & Hcc during CMS and state inspections, most recent first.
The facility failed to adequately prepare and communicate with residents and families regarding a sudden closure, leading to distress and confusion. Residents were given insufficient notice, and necessary documentation was not provided to receiving facilities, disrupting continuity of care.
The facility failed to provide the required 60-day notice of closure to residents, their representatives, and the ombudsman, leading to a rushed and disorganized transfer process. Multiple residents and families reported receiving significantly less notice than required, with some being informed verbally and others not receiving written notice at all. The lack of adherence to closure policies resulted in confusion and distress among residents and their families.
The facility failed to implement proper closure procedures, leading to a rushed and disorganized discharge process for 30 residents. The administrator did not have a closure plan initially, resulting in inadequate communication with residents, families, and the Ombudsman. Essential medical documents were not transferred with residents, causing distress and confusion. The rushed timeline was due to concerns about staff leaving, despite a 60-day notice being claimed by the Regional Director.
Inadequate Resident Discharge Preparation and Communication
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to provide adequate preparation and orientation for resident discharges, leading to significant distress among residents and their families. The report highlights that residents were informed of the facility's closure with insufficient notice, causing anxiety and confusion. For instance, one resident was informed of the closure through a note handed by a nurse, and later confirmed by the administrator and business office manager, giving her only a week to find a new facility. This abrupt notice left residents feeling shocked and devastated, as they were not given enough time to process the information or say goodbye to friends. The report also details the lack of communication and coordination in transferring residents to new facilities. Several family members reported not receiving written notifications about the closure and were only informed verbally. In some cases, residents were moved without their families being notified, leading to further distress. Additionally, the facility failed to provide necessary documentation to the receiving facilities, such as care plans, MDS assessments, and immunization records, which are crucial for the continuity of care. This lack of documentation and communication exacerbated the residents' anxiety and confusion during the transition. Furthermore, the facility did not adhere to the required 60-day notice for closure, as mandated by regulations. Instead, residents and families were told they had to move within one to two weeks due to concerns about staff leaving. This rushed process was not in line with the facility's closure policy, which was not even available to the administrator until after the closure process had begun. The report indicates that the facility's actions were not only inadequate but also potentially harmful to the residents' well-being, as they were forced to leave their home without proper preparation or support.
Failure to Provide Adequate Notice for Facility Closure
Penalty
Summary
The facility administrator failed to provide the required 60-day notice of closure to residents, their representatives, and the ombudsman, as mandated by federal regulations. The facility's closure policy was not properly implemented, and there was no documented closure plan available at the time of the survey. The administrator, V1, admitted to not having the closure policy for the first three days after being informed of the closure and only received it after a surveyor requested it. This lack of preparation and adherence to policy led to a rushed and disorganized transfer process for the residents. Multiple residents and their families reported being informed of the facility's closure with significantly less notice than required. For instance, one family member, V2, was notified on November 4th that the facility would close by December 31st, but their relative was transferred just four days later without proper notification. Another family member, V3, was verbally informed of the closure but never received written notice, and their relative was moved unexpectedly from the hospital to a new facility. These instances highlight the facility's failure to provide adequate notice and involve families in the transfer process. The facility's actions resulted in confusion and distress among residents and their families. Several family members expressed frustration over the lack of time to prepare for the transfer and the absence of written communication. The ombudsman, V20, also noted the rapid pace of the closure and the lack of proper notification, as the letter was initially sent to the wrong ombudsman. The facility's failure to adhere to closure policies and provide timely, written notice to all parties involved led to a chaotic and poorly managed transition for the residents.
Inadequate Facility Closure Procedures Lead to Chaotic Resident Discharges
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to develop and implement adequate policies and procedures for facility closure, which resulted in a chaotic and rushed discharge process for all 30 residents. The administrator, V1, was informed of the closure on November 4, 2024, and began notifying families and residents without a proper closure plan in place. The facility did not provide timely written notice to the State Survey Agency, the State LTC Ombudsman, or the residents' legal representatives as required by federal regulations. The administrator admitted to not having the closure policy for the first three days and only received it after a surveyor requested it. The facility's actions led to confusion and distress among residents and their families. Residents were informed they had to leave within one to two weeks, despite the official closure date being January 1, 2025. This rushed timeline was attributed to concerns about staff leaving, which would impact resident care. However, the Regional Director of Operations, V19, stated that a 60-day notice was given and that agency staff had been hired to cover potential staff shortages. The Ombudsman, V20, was not properly notified and only learned of the closure through another source, highlighting the lack of communication and organization. The transfer process was poorly managed, with essential medical documents and care plans not being sent with residents to their new facilities. The Director of Nursing, V10, admitted to not sending care plans, MDS assessments, or immunization records, and no report was called to the receiving facilities. Residents and their families expressed feelings of shock, devastation, and heartbreak over the abrupt move, with some residents not being informed of their transfer until it was already underway. The lack of proper planning and communication resulted in a disorganized and distressing experience for all involved.
Latest citations in Illinois
A resident with severe mental illness, cognitive impairment, and a well-documented history of elopement and exit-seeking was placed on 1:1 monitoring but was allowed by a CNA to be behind a closed bedroom door and out of direct visual supervision, contrary to facility expectations for 1:1 status. During this lapse, the resident exited through a window, climbed a fence, and was later found outside with a displaced foot fracture. In a separate incident, a cognitively intact resident with a history of substance abuse, whose family visits were supposed to be supervised, had an unsupervised visit with grandparents known to bring contraband, was later found unresponsive with signs of overdose, received naloxone, and tested positive for oxycodone despite having no order for it, while his roommate had an active oxycodone prescription and staff found a white powdery substance and related items in the room, indicating a failure to prevent resident access to an unprescribed opioid.
A resident with multiple chronic conditions and severe cognitive impairment was found unresponsive and not breathing, with no documented code status, POLST, or DNR in the medical record. Nursing staff verified the absence of respirations and pulse but did not initiate CPR or call 911. An LPN reported she proposed starting CPR due to the unknown code status, but an RN declined. Leadership and clinical staff stated in interviews that facility practice and expectations are that, when a code status is unknown or no POLST is on file, the resident is to be treated as full code and CPR should be initiated.
A resident with multiple comorbidities was admitted with an unstageable sacral pressure ulcer and placed on Medi-Honey dressings three times weekly. Over several weeks, the wound enlarged and remained covered with slough, but a wound specialist NP was not consulted until the ulcer had significantly worsened. When the NP did evaluate the wound, she performed debridements and ordered daily Dakin’s solution and later Dakin’s with Silvadene and calcium alginate, but the facility’s TAR showed staff largely continued Medi-Honey three times weekly, applied Dakin’s on only a few days, and never administered Silvadene. The wound progressed to a stage 4 ulcer with odor and signs of infection, later cultured positive for MRSA and diagnosed in the hospital as an infected stage 4 decubitus ulcer with osteomyelitis requiring surgical debridement, contrary to the facility’s own policy requiring timely reassessment and implementation of MD/NP-directed wound care.
A resident with extensive traumatic fractures, internal injuries, and a long history of chronic pain management was admitted on existing orders for ibuprofen PRN and Percocet for pain, with hospital discharge instructions indicating scheduled Percocet three times daily. During the first night after admission, staff administered only ibuprofen, documented as ineffective, and did not provide any Percocet because the hospital had not sent written narcotic prescriptions and the DON did not obtain a timely verbal order to access Percocet from the emergency kit. The resident repeatedly complained of severe, escalating pain, used the call light frequently, yelled out, and ultimately called 911, signed out AMA, and was transported to the ED, where she reported uncontrolled pain and opioid withdrawal symptoms and received Percocet.
The facility did not maintain ceiling structures and plumbing in a safe and clean condition, resulting in long‑standing stained and bulging ceiling tiles above the nurses’ station and an actively leaking pipe in the ice machine/vending area. Surveyors observed missing ceiling tiles exposing insulation, wiring, and water pipes, standing water collected in a trash can, and soaked blankets and towels on the floor. An RN and an LPN reported that the ceiling tiles above the nurses’ station had been stained for months or longer, and that the ceiling had been leaking in the ice machine area for several days, where the ice machine is used for all residents. The Regional Maintenance Director confirmed the stained tiles and the leaking pipe and acknowledged that the tiles had not yet been replaced.
The facility did not ensure that all CNAs received the required 12 hours of annual competency in‑service training, including dementia care and abuse prevention. Review of records for two agency CNAs showed no documented annual CNA training, despite a facility assessment stating that nurse aide in‑services must total at least 12 hours per year and address competency needs. One agency CNA reported not receiving any annual competency training or knowing it was required, and another reported receiving no training in the past year while providing care to all residents. The AIT and DON confirmed that these CNAs had not received the required annual training from either the facility or their agency.
The facility did not ensure that all CNAs, including agency CNAs, received required behavioral health training as outlined in its facility assessment, which called for dementia management, resident abuse prevention, and care of cognitively impaired residents with behaviors. Review of training records for two agency CNAs showed no behavioral health training over the prior year, and both CNAs reported they had not received such training from either the facility or their agency, despite one CNA confirming they provide care to all residents. The AIT and DON acknowledged that these CNAs had not received the required behavioral health training.
Surveyors identified multiple unsanitary conditions and ineffective sanitization practices in the kitchen, including a non-functioning, leaking garbage disposal with rotting food, leaking pipes near the ice machine, and a dirty HVAC unit shedding debris onto surfaces. The kitchen door to the dining room was damaged and improperly hinged, and staff reported it had recently been cut and sanded as part of a replacement. The wall-mounted chemical dispenser lacked compatible sanitizer bottles, and when staff prepared sanitizer solution, test strips showed no chlorine present; staff instead used dish soap and multipurpose cleaner from housekeeping to clean food contact surfaces. These failures affected the sanitation of food preparation and service areas for all residents in the facility.
A resident with dementia and behavioral disturbances consistently kept her TV volume excessively loud, to the point it could be heard from the nurse’s station and the end of the hallway, disturbing nearby residents who reported difficulty sleeping and ongoing disruption. Multiple residents stated that the loud TV had been a problem for some time, especially at night, and one reported needing headphones to block the noise. Staff, including an LPN and a CNA, confirmed frequent complaints, noted that the resident became verbally aggressive when asked to lower the volume, and reported that she insisted on keeping her door open and held the remote to prevent staff from adjusting the sound, despite a care plan indicating an agreed-upon lower volume level.
A resident with a known history of aggressive behavior deliberately kicked another resident while residents were lined up for a smoke break, causing the victim to fall onto his hip and later report ongoing left hip pain requiring an X-ray. Multiple witnesses, including another resident and CNAs, described the act as intentional physical abuse. Although an LPN, the DON, and the ADON all recognized the event as reportable abuse under facility policy, facility staff did not call the police or an ambulance for the victim despite his repeated requests, and the Administrator confirmed the incident was not reported to the state surveying agency.
Failure to Supervise High-Risk Resident on 1:1 and Prevent Access to Unprescribed Opioid
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to prevent accidents and ensure adequate supervision for residents at high risk for elopement and substance misuse. One resident with schizophrenia, psychosis, major depressive disorder, severe cognitive impairment, and a documented history of wandering, elopement, and exit-seeking behaviors was identified as an elopement risk and placed on an elopement care plan and 1:1 supervision. Nursing and psychiatry notes documented repeated attempts by this resident to use keypads, push and kick exit doors, set off alarms, hover at exits, attempt to climb through windows, and a prior incident of exiting the building and being returned by social services. Despite this, while on 1:1 monitoring, the assigned CNA allowed the resident’s bedroom door to be fully closed and the resident to be out of direct line of sight, contrary to the facility’s expectations that residents on 1:1 remain in continuous visual contact with the aide and that doors not be shut. On the morning of the elopement event, the night-shift CNA reported that the resident had been up visiting, eating, and sleeping, and that at 5:45 AM the resident was in her room on the floor. Shortly thereafter, the resident stated she wanted to use the bathroom; the CNA reported seeing her enter the bathroom with the bedroom door left open so the bathroom door could be observed. When the day-shift CNA arrived to assume the 1:1, she found the bedroom door completely shut, opened it, and was told by the night-shift CNA that the resident was in the bathroom. After briefly leaving to put away her belongings and returning, the day-shift CNA found the resident no longer in the room and the window open. The nurse initiated a headcount and search, and the resident was found outside near a tree, holding herself up due to foot pain. Investigation and hospital records showed the resident had exited through her window, climbed over a fence approximately six feet high, and sustained a displaced fracture of the left metatarsal bone after landing on the ground while attempting to escape. A second deficiency concerns the facility’s failure to ensure a resident with a history of substance abuse was protected from access to an opioid medication not prescribed to him. This resident, cognitively intact with diagnoses including schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, and major depression, had a care plan noting behavior problems and a history of returning from family outings intoxicated or under the influence of unknown substances, with instructions that family visits be supervised in common areas. On the day of the incident, the resident, who lived on a locked behavior unit, had an unsupervised visit outside with grandparents known by staff to have previously brought contraband into the building. Later that day, staff observed the resident stumbling in the hallway wearing sunglasses and then becoming unresponsive in his room, with slow, abnormal breathing and no response to sternal rubs. Nurses recognized signs consistent with drug overdose, administered naloxone, and the resident was transferred to the emergency room, where a urine drug screen was positive for oxycodone, despite no oxycodone order for this resident. Further review showed that the resident’s roommate at the time had an active PRN order for oxycodone 5 mg for pain related to a right tibia fracture, and both residents had histories of substance abuse. Staff reported finding a white powdery substance and empty bags with white residue in the overdosed resident’s dresser drawer, and another resident on the unit was found snorting a crushed substance with paraphernalia on his dresser. The DON acknowledged that the overdosed resident had an oxycodone overdose diagnosis from the emergency room and that it was plausible he had taken the roommate’s medication, although the exact source of the oxycodone could not be confirmed. Facility policies required that medications, including controlled substances such as oxycodone, be administered only to the resident for whom they were prescribed and be securely stored in locked compartments inaccessible to residents and visitors, but the events showed that the resident was able to obtain and self-administer oxycodone that was not prescribed to him.
Failure to Initiate CPR for Resident With Unknown Code Status
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and call emergency medical services for an unresponsive resident whose code status was unknown. The resident had been admitted with diagnoses including chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cirrhosis of the liver, hypertension, and dysphagia, and was documented as severely cognitively impaired and dependent on staff for several activities of daily living. The resident’s medical record did not contain any documentation of a code status, POLST, DNR order, or other advance directive limiting resuscitative efforts. In the early morning hours, a nurse entered the resident’s room to assist the roommate and observed that the resident was not breathing but was still warm to the touch. The nurse then obtained a second nurse to verify the absence of breathing. The facility’s final investigation report states that the nurse assessed the resident and noted absence of respirations, absence of a palpable pulse, and physical findings consistent with post-mortem changes, and determined the resident had expired. Despite the lack of any documented DNR or advance directive in the record available for review at that time, CPR was not initiated and 911 was not called. Interviews with staff confirmed that the resident’s code status was unknown at the time of the event and that no resuscitative efforts were made. The ADON stated that if a resident’s code status or POLST form cannot be found, the resident is considered a full code, and that when in doubt a resident is a full code. The DON reported that the LPN who found the resident did not know the code status and did not initiate CPR or call 911, even though the resident was a recent admission and no POLST form was on file. The LPN stated she suggested initiating CPR because there was no POLST, but the RN present told her not to start CPR. Other staff interviewed stated that if a resident’s code status is not known or cannot be found, CPR is supposed to be initiated.
Failure to Obtain Timely Wound Consultation and Implement Ordered Pressure Ulcer Treatments
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure timely wound specialist involvement and adherence to ordered wound treatments for a resident admitted with an existing unstageable sacral-coccygeal pressure ulcer. The resident, a 75-year-old with multiple comorbidities including type 2 diabetes mellitus, prior necrotizing fasciitis, hemiplegia, DVT, and hypothyroidism, was admitted with an unstageable sacral pressure ulcer measuring 1.5 cm x 1.5 cm, fully covered with slough but documented as clean, without odor or signs of infection. The admission physician orders indicated the resident may be seen by a wound care physician, and the initial treatment ordered on admission was cleansing the coccyx area, applying skin prep, Medi-Honey, fluff gauze, and a dry dressing three times weekly and as needed. Despite this, the wound care nurse did not obtain a wound specialist consultation until approximately five weeks after admission, during which time the wound measurements increased and remained unstageable with slough covering the wound bed. Over the ensuing weeks, the wound care nurse documented weekly assessments showing progressive enlargement of the wound, which by early November measured 4.3 cm x 3.8 cm with excoriation around the wound and a bed fully covered with slough. The treatment administration record for November showed the resident continued to receive the same Medi-Honey treatment three times a week. The wound specialist NP first evaluated the resident on a date in early November, documenting an unstageable/unclassified pressure ulcer measuring 5.0 cm x 6.0 cm x 0.2 cm with 100% slough, moderate serosanguinous drainage without odor, and no signs of infection in the peri-wound area. The NP recommended cleansing, Medi-Honey, calcium alginate, and foam dressing three times weekly and as needed, and performed a bedside debridement to remove slough and necrotic tissue. A second debridement was performed one week later, after which the NP ordered Dakin’s 1/4 strength solution with wet-to-moist gauze and foam dressing daily and as needed. The NP later documented that Dakin’s was ordered as a debriding agent and antiseptic to help prevent infection and that daily treatment was important. Despite the NP’s subsequent orders and recommendations, the facility did not consistently implement the updated wound care regimen. The NP’s note on a mid-November visit documented the wound as now a stage 4 pressure injury measuring 6.5 cm x 4.5 cm x 2.0 cm, with moderate serosanguinous drainage and odor, 100% slough, and peri-wound signs and symptoms of infection. The NP ordered a wound culture and topical antibiotics, including Dakin’s solution and Silvadene cream with calcium alginate and foam or dry dressing daily and as needed. However, the treatment administration record showed the resident continued to receive Medi-Honey three times weekly, with Dakin’s solution applied only on three specific days and no documentation that Silvadene was ever provided. The wound nurse acknowledged that she typically received verbal orders from the NP and did not read the NP’s written notes for one to two days, and that the only change she recalled was increasing Medi-Honey frequency and later changing to Santyl. The primary physician stated he relied on consultants’ recommendations, but the record showed the resident was not seen by the wound specialist until the wound had significantly deteriorated. Ultimately, the wound culture was positive for MRSA, and hospital records documented an infected stage 4 sacral decubitus ulcer with osteomyelitis requiring operative excisional debridement of skin, subcutaneous fat, muscle, and fascia. The facility’s own wound prevention and healing policy required nurses to provide wound care per physician orders, notify the physician of lack of progress, and have the wound MD/NP evaluate and change treatment when the patient was not responding, which was not followed in this case.
Failure to Provide Ordered Opioid Analgesia for Resident With Severe Traumatic Injuries
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide ordered opioid pain medication to a newly admitted resident with extensive traumatic injuries and a history of chronic pain management. The resident was admitted following a serious motor vehicle accident that resulted in multiple fractures (thoracic vertebrae, ribs, pelvis, sacrum, humerus, ilium), lung contusions, traumatic pneumothorax, liver and spleen lacerations, and hemoperitoneum. Hospital documentation showed that prior to admission the resident had been on Percocet 5-325 mg three times daily as an outpatient and was discharged from the hospital with instructions to continue Percocet 5-325 mg one tablet three times daily (scheduled) and ibuprofen 800 mg every 8 hours as needed for pain. The facility’s physician orders on admission included ibuprofen 800 mg every 8 hours as needed and Percocet 5-325 mg every 8 hours as needed for pain. On the evening and night following admission, the facility administered only ibuprofen and did not provide any Percocet, despite the resident’s repeated complaints of severe pain. The MAR documented that ibuprofen 800 mg was given late in the evening for a pain level of 4 and was noted as ineffective in controlling the pain, with no documentation that Percocet was ever administered. The DON documented that the hospital had not sent written prescriptions (“hard scripts”) for the narcotic pain medication, that the pharmacy reported not receiving such scripts, and that the facility was unable to access narcotics from the emergency kit without a prescription. The DON contacted the pharmacy and the hospital but did not obtain an order that would allow access to Percocet from the emergency kit, and she did not contact a provider at the time she first realized the resident had arrived without the necessary narcotic prescriptions. The DON later stated she was not aware that a verbal order could have been used to access the emergency kit and acknowledged there was a discrepancy between the facility’s PRN Percocet order and the hospital’s scheduled Percocet order, of which she had not been aware. Throughout the night, the resident continued to report uncontrolled pain, which she later described as escalating to 10/10, and she reported yelling out in pain and repeatedly requesting Percocet. CNAs reported that the resident was constantly on the call light, complaining about needing pain pills, threatening to sign out AMA, and yelling out. The DON documented that the resident complained of pain and inability to sleep, had received PRN ibuprofen, and that vital signs were within normal limits; she also noted that the resident had two loose stools but did not associate them with opioid withdrawal. The pharmacy director confirmed that the correct dose of Percocet was available in the emergency kit and that it could have been accessed with a provider’s emergency verbal order. The medical director stated that, had he been contacted sooner, he could have given a verbal order to access Percocet from the emergency kit or ordered transfer to the ER. Instead, after the resident called 911 requesting transport for pain management, the medical director eventually ordered transfer to the ER at the resident’s request, and the resident signed AMA paperwork stating she would not return. In the ER, the resident presented with complaints of pain all over, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and reported opioid withdrawal symptoms, with documentation that no pain medication had been administered between the time of admission to the facility and arrival at the ER, approximately 12 hours later. The ER administered Percocet and discharged her with a prescription for Percocet. The facility’s own pain management policy stated that it was the policy of the facility to respect and support the resident’s right to optimal pain assessment and management, and referenced an opioid use policy and procedure. Despite this, the record shows that the facility did not provide the ordered opioid medication, did not resolve the lack of a written prescription in a timely manner through available mechanisms (such as obtaining a verbal order to access the emergency kit), and did not adjust its actions when ibuprofen was documented as ineffective. The combination of the resident’s extensive injuries, documented chronic pain management history, hospital discharge instructions for scheduled Percocet, and the facility’s failure to administer any Percocet or secure timely prescriber authorization led to the resident experiencing uncontrolled pain, reporting opioid withdrawal symptoms, and ultimately signing out AMA and calling 911 for transport to the ER for pain management.
Failure to Maintain Safe and Well-Repaired Ceilings and Plumbing
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to maintain the physical environment in a safe, clean, and well‑repaired condition, specifically related to ceiling tiles and a cold water pipe. The Facility Maintenance Director job description required planning, organizing, and directing maintenance operations to ensure the building was safe and comfortable, including repairing facility property, coordinating outside vendors when needed, maintaining supplies and equipment, promptly reporting damage to the Administrator, and making weekly inspections. A former Maintenance Director was terminated for incompetence and unsatisfactory job performance, including failure to complete assigned tasks such as fixing or replacing stained ceiling tiles by an established deadline. At the time of the survey, the facility census was 72 residents, all potentially affected by the environmental deficiencies. On observation, surveyors noted an actively leaking water pipe in the ceiling of the ice machine/vending area, with a trash can placed beneath it containing about one inch of standing water, two soaked blankets and multiple wet towels on the floor, and a missing 2x2 ceiling tile exposing insulation, wiring, and water pipes. Twelve ceiling tiles above the nurses’ desk were brown‑stained and visibly bulging, suggesting ongoing water damage, and on a subsequent day the ice machine/vending area still had two missing 2x2 ceiling tiles with exposed insulation, wiring, and pipes. An RN reported that the ceiling tiles above the nurses’ station had been stained since she began working there months earlier, and an LPN stated the tiles had been stained for as long as she could remember and that the ceiling had been leaking in the ice machine area for several days, noting that the ice machine there was used for all residents. The Regional Maintenance Director confirmed the stained tiles above the nurses’ station and the leaking pipe in the ice machine/vending area, stating that the tiles had not yet been changed because they took time to cut and no one had done it.
Failure to Provide Required Annual Competency Training for CNAs
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to ensure all CNAs received the required 12 hours of annual competency in‑service training, including dementia care and abuse prevention, as required by its Facility Assessment Tool and federal regulations. The Facility Daily Census Report documented 72 residents residing in the facility at the time of the survey. The Facility Assessment Tool specified that required in‑service training for nurse aides must be at least 12 hours per year, sufficient to ensure continuing competence, address areas of weakness identified in performance reviews and the facility assessment, and may address special resident needs. Review of employee and training records for two agency CNAs (V9 and V10) for the period 4/30/25 through 4/30/26 showed no documentation of the required 12 hours of annual CNA competency training. During interviews, one agency CNA (V9) stated that they had not received 12 hours of annual competency training from either the facility or the hiring agency and were unaware of the requirement for 12 hours of annual training. Another agency CNA (V10) stated they had not received any training within the last year and confirmed they provide care to all residents in the facility. The Administrator‑In‑Training (V1) and the DON (V2) both confirmed that V9 and V10 had not received the required 12 hours of annual CNA training from either the facility or the agency that employed them.
Lack of Behavioral Health Training for Agency CNAs
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to ensure that all Certified Nurse Aides (CNAs), including agency CNAs, received behavioral health training as required by the facility’s own Facility Assessment Tool. The Facility Assessment Tool dated 3/26/26 specifies that required in‑service training for nurse aides must include dementia management, resident abuse prevention, and, for nurse aides providing services to individuals with cognitive impairments, training on the care of cognitively impaired residents with behaviors. Review of the Facility Daily Census Report dated 4/29/26 shows that 72 residents were residing in the facility at the time of the survey. Review of the employee and training records for two agency CNAs (V9 and V10) for the period 4/30/25 through 4/30/26 showed no documentation of behavioral health training. In interviews, one agency CNA (V9) stated that they had not received behavioral health training from either the facility or the hiring agency, and another agency CNA (V10) stated they had not received any training within the last year and confirmed they provide care to all residents in the facility. The Administrator‑In‑Training (V1) and the DON (V2) confirmed that these agency CNAs had not received behavioral health training from the facility or their agency.
Unsanitary Kitchen Conditions and Ineffective Surface Sanitization
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to maintain effective sanitizer levels for cleaning food contact surfaces and to keep kitchen equipment in a safe and sanitary condition, potentially affecting all 64 residents documented on the census. During a kitchen walkthrough, surveyors observed a non-functioning garbage disposal containing chunks of food and clotted milk with water leaking from the seals, pooling on the floor, and draining into a floor drain, accompanied by a strong odor of rotting food. The sprayer above the disposal had hard water buildup that caused water to spray outward onto the wall, floor, and surrounding area. Pipes to the ice machine were leaking water down the wall and pooling on the floor. The HVAC unit in the kitchen had a large amount of brownish dirt and debris, including brown fuzzy lint-like material, with some pieces falling onto the surface below. The kitchen door to the large dining room had a broken top hinge, loose bolts, and a jagged, splintered knob-side edge. Staff interviews and observations further showed improper sanitation practices and lack of appropriate chemical supplies. The cook reported the garbage disposal had been leaking and non-functional for about a week and that maintenance staff were aware but unable to fix it. The cook also stated that maintenance staff had been sawing and sanding a replacement door in the kitchen while food was being cooked and served, although the maintenance director later stated the cutting and sanding were done outside. The wall-mounted chemical dispenser above the kitchen sink had no sanitizer bottles attached. When the dishwasher and assistant dietary manager prepared sanitizer solution using the dispenser, test strips showed no chlorine color change, and the dishwasher was unsure what color the strip should turn. The assistant dietary manager stated the facility did not have compatible chemical bottles for the dispenser and that staff were instead using dish soap in sanitizer buckets and multipurpose cleaner from housekeeping. The administrator stated the facility did not have an environmental policy for maintaining equipment.
Failure to Control Excessive TV Noise Affecting Nearby Residents
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to maintain environmental noise at a comfortable level for multiple residents due to one resident’s excessively loud television. Surveyors observed that one resident’s TV volume was so loud it could be heard from the nurse’s station and from the end of the hallway, even with other residents’ doors closed. A sign on this resident’s door stated “Do Not Shut Door,” and staff reported that the resident liked the TV volume loud and was non-compliant with requests to lower it. Nursing notes documented that when asked to reduce the TV volume, the resident became verbally aggressive toward staff. The resident’s diagnoses included unspecified dementia with behavioral disturbance, adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, hemiplegia and hemiparesis following cerebral infarction, and restlessness and agitation. Other residents on the same hall reported ongoing disruption from the loud TV, particularly at night when they were trying to sleep. One resident across the hall stated that the loud TV had been an issue for a while and affected other residents on the hall. Another resident one room away reported that the neighbor’s TV was really loud all day and especially at night, that staff were asked to intervene, and that the resident with the loud TV would briefly turn it down and then increase the volume again; this resident reported needing to use headphones to cancel out the noise. Staff, including an LPN and a CNA, confirmed that residents complained they could not sleep due to the loud TV, that the resident with the TV became upset and verbally aggressive when asked to turn it down, and that the TV volume could be heard from the end of the hallway. The care plan for the resident with the loud TV identified a problem of turning the volume up excessively, with an agreed target volume level of 40 and instructions for staff to remind the resident of this agreed volume.
Failure to Protect Resident From Physical Abuse and to Report Incident
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to protect a resident from physical abuse by another resident when one resident with a known history of antagonistic, verbally and physically aggressive behavior kicked another resident, causing a fall and subsequent pain. Multiple witnesses, including another resident and two CNAs, reported that while residents were lined up for a smoke break, the aggressor resident grabbed the victim resident’s leg in an attempt to make him fall and, when that failed, deliberately kicked the victim’s left leg or knee, causing him to fall onto his left hip. The victim resident consistently reported that the kick knocked him off his feet, that he landed on his left hip, and that he continued to experience left hip and buttock pain rated 5/10 with walking and lying on his back. A behavior note documented that the aggressor resident stood up from his wheelchair and kicked the victim resident in the leg for no reason, witnessed by residents and staff, and a subsequent nurse’s note documented the victim’s complaint of left hip pain and an order for a left hip and pelvis X-ray. Despite staff recognizing the event as physical abuse and a reportable incident under the facility’s Abuse and Retaliation Prevention and Reporting policy, the facility did not take required reporting and response actions. An LPN stated that the incident was reportable and notified the Administrator, and both the DON and ADON acknowledged that one resident kicking another constitutes physical abuse that should be reported to the state surveying agency and to the police. However, the Administrator confirmed that the facility did not report the incident to the state surveying agency and that facility staff did not call the police or an ambulance for the victim resident, even though the victim repeatedly requested that the police and an ambulance be called. Instead, the aggressor resident independently called 911 for himself. The facility’s own policy defines physical abuse as willful infliction of injury, including kicking, and affirms residents’ right to be free from abuse, but these standards were not followed in this incident.
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