Citations in Florida
Statistics, citations and compliance trends for long-term care facilities in Florida.
Statistics for Florida (Last 12 Months)
Financial Impact (Last 12 Months)
Compliance trends in Florida
Data through Mar 2026Comparisons below measure the most recent period Apr 2025 – Mar 2026 against the prior period Apr 2024 – Mar 2025 (two equal 12-month windows). The most recent 2 months are excluded because CMS is still publishing them.
Top tags by month · last 24 months
dashed = still reportingMonthly citation counts for the 5 most-cited tags. The dashed tail is the 2-month reporting lag.
Frequency movers
Biggest change in how often each tag is cited, as a rate per 100 inspections (so it isn't skewed by survey volume): Apr 2025 – Mar 2026 vs the prior period Apr 2024 – Mar 2025. Only tags with at least 20 citations in both periods are shown.
Severity movers
Tags whose average scope/severity shifted the most: Apr 2025 – Mar 2026 vs the prior period Apr 2024 – Mar 2025. The number is the average severity on the A–L scale (A=0…L=11); the letter is the band it falls in. A rise means the same tag is being cited at a more serious level — note the average can move enough to rank here while staying within the same letter. Same 20-citation minimum applies.
Care domain movers
Citations grouped into CFR care domains — F-tags by their §483 regulatory section (CMS State Operations Manual, Appendix PP) — measured as a rate per 100 inspections: Apr 2025 – Mar 2026 vs the prior period Apr 2024 – Mar 2025. Share is the domain's portion of citations this period; avg severity is the mean scope/severity letter and immediate jeopardy the percentage cited at J–L, both over the current period. Domains with at least 20 citations in both periods are shown; the sparkline tracks the last 12 months (left = oldest).
Immediate jeopardies · this period
Citations at the most serious scope/severity — J–L, immediate jeopardy, residents placed at risk of serious harm or death — over Apr 2025 – Mar 2026 vs the prior period Apr 2024 – Mar 2025. "Surveys with an IJ" counts distinct health inspections that had at least one.
Survey activity · by month
faded/dashed = still reportingCitations each month split into complaint-driven (unscheduled, triggered by grievances) vs standard surveys — bars, left axis — with the number of inspections as a line on the right axis. Rising inspections signal more scrutiny; a rising complaint share means more off-cycle surveys. The most recent 2 months are still being reported.
Deficiency-free survey rate
Share of health surveys that found zero deficiencies — the odds of a clean survey. Apr 2025 – Mar 2026 vs the prior period Apr 2024 – Mar 2025; the most recent 2 months are still being reported (dashed).
Penalties · by month
faded = still reportingTotal civil money penalty dollars imposed on the state's facilities each month — how hard the state is enforcing. The most recent 2 months are still being reported, and penalties often lag citations by several months.
Emerging tags
Tags that weren't established last period but surged — an early warning, distinct from movers (which track already-common tags). Criteria: fewer than 20 citations in the prior period, but at least 10 this period and 2.5× their prior volume. The sparkline shows monthly counts over the last 12 months (left = oldest).
Latest Citations in Florida
Surveyors found that the facility failed to comply with 42 CFR 483.73(a) by not conducting the required annual review and update of its Emergency Preparedness (EP) plan. During record review, no documentation showed that the EP plan had been reviewed or updated within the past year, and the Administrator confirmed that the Emergency Management Plan had not been reviewed or revised as required.
Surveyors found that smoke/fire-rated enclosures were not properly maintained, with penetrations in smoke barriers in several general storage rooms across multiple smoke compartments. The Maintenance Director stated that insulation and fiberglass were used to pack and cover these holes but could not confirm that the materials were approved for fire-rated construction. Inspectors observed penetrations covered with fiberglass and noted a hole in one fiberglass panel in a storage room, resulting in a deficiency under NFPA 101 requirements for smoke barrier construction.
Surveyors found that fixed patient-care electrical equipment was not properly maintained or inspected in accordance with NFPA 99. In one room, a bedside remote had mismatched insulation and exposed wiring, and in another room, a call button receptacle had exposed low-voltage conductors. The Maintenance Director acknowledged both issues and reported that new bed remotes had been received but not yet installed.
Surveyors found that the facility failed to maintain a safe, clean, and homelike environment, with strong, persistent urine and feces odors noted throughout multiple halls and confirmed by staff. On two nursing units, hallways and resident rooms contained torn flooring, food debris, broken blinds, dirty and leaking toilets and sinks, rusted and corroded fixtures, missing outlet covers with oxygen concentrators plugged in, exposed light sockets, unmade and visibly soiled beds, and black, mold-like substances on walls and around toilet bases. Bathrooms had missing ceiling tiles, cracked door facings with brown stains, used briefs and torn toilet paper on floors, and toilets with brown or rust-like buildup. Outside, the patio and fencing area had broken and rotted railings, exposed rusted nails, fallen palm fronds, and overgrown vegetation, and the Administrator acknowledged the area was not safe for residents. Housekeeping and maintenance staff described daily cleaning and a work-order process, but the Maintenance Director reported being unaware of many of the observed issues, and the DON confirmed there was no specific environmental cleaning policy despite job descriptions and a general policy requiring a safe, sanitary, and comfortable environment.
A resident exited the building through a bedroom window, walked off the property, and was observed and redirected by staff with assistance from law enforcement, who encountered the resident down the road and helped escort the resident back. The facility’s internal documentation lacked staff or witness statements and characterized the event as the resident remaining on facility grounds without injury. Despite the resident’s account, a police report, and a maintenance staff report confirming that the resident left the premises and that law enforcement responded, the DON did not report the incident to required state and federal agencies, even though the DON acknowledged that any incident involving law enforcement response must be reported.
A resident with moderate cognitive impairment and a history of stroke was repeatedly observed over several days in visibly soiled clothing and bedding, with a strong urine odor, despite stating multiple times that he had requested assistance with changing and hygiene. Documentation indicated he was independent with toileting and personal hygiene and only occasionally incontinent, but his care plan lacked detail on the level of assistance needed, while an LPN reported he actually required staff help with bathing, grooming, toileting, and care. Laundry practices involved leaving clean, labeled clothing bagged in the linen room for nursing staff to distribute rather than returning it directly to rooms, and the DON reported that staff were expected to round every two hours and as needed to keep residents clean and dry, although there were no written ADL or resident care policies in place.
Surveyors observed four full O2 cylinders on one nursing unit stored unsecured directly on the floor under a sign labeled "FULL CYLINDERS" instead of in a secured storage rack. The ADON confirmed the cylinders were full and should not be on the ground. Reference to NFPA 99 showed that freestanding cylinders must be protected from damage and properly chained or supported in a stand or cart. The DON and Maintenance Director both acknowledged that O2 cylinders are required to be stored in a secure rack, should never be on the floor, and that unsecured cylinders on the floor present a safety risk.
A resident with multiple cardiopulmonary conditions and a documented full code status was found unresponsive without pulse or respirations during the night shift. A CNA notified the RN, who either instructed CNAs to clean and cover the resident or, per her and an LPN’s account, called a code blue and performed CPR with the LPN for about 20 minutes before stopping, without calling 911. The RN believed the resident was on hospice and did not verify code status, then notified the DON, provider, and family instead of EMS. Several hours later, after the DON called the facility and asked whether 911 had been contacted, the RN called 911 and briefly reinitiated CPR shortly before EMS arrived and pronounced the resident deceased, documenting postmortem changes. The facility’s investigation and root cause analysis found that staff failed to follow policy requiring immediate EMS activation and continuous CPR for full code residents until EMS arrival, leading to an Immediate Jeopardy finding.
A resident with full code status was found unresponsive without respirations or pulse during the night shift. An RN and an LPN initiated CPR but did not activate EMS, and they discontinued CPR after about 20 minutes. The RN, who lacked documented orientation and competency assessment and had obtained BLS certification through a fully online, non–instructor-led course, pronounced the resident deceased without authority and later stated she believed the resident was on hospice and did not verify code status. The LPN’s BLS certification was expired, and a CNA with an expired BLS certification performed several chest compressions despite facility policy that CNAs were not to perform CPR. The RN had not participated in documented code blue drills, and leadership confirmed that required clinical orientation and skills competencies had not been completed for her, leading surveyors to determine that staff were not adequately trained or competent to respond to a cardiopulmonary arrest for a full code resident, resulting in an Immediate Jeopardy finding.
Surveyors found multiple instances of improper use of relocatable power taps (RPTs) and extension cords during a facility tour with the Maintenance Director. In the social services office, an RPT was plugged into another RPT connected to a wall outlet, with the cord running across a walkway and taped to the floor. In the multipurpose room, a television was plugged into an extension cord, and in the MDS office, an RPT was plugged into another RPT with an outlet adapter in use. These conditions did not comply with NFPA 101, NFPA 99, and NFPA 70 standards governing electrical equipment, power strips, and extension cords.
Failure to Annually Review and Update Emergency Preparedness Plan
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors identified a deficiency related to the facility’s Emergency Preparedness (EP) Program under 42 CFR 483.73(a). During record review at 4:00 PM, surveyors examined the facility’s EP documentation and found no evidence that the emergency preparedness plan had been reviewed or updated on an annual basis as required. The regulation mandates that LTC facilities develop and maintain an emergency preparedness plan that is reviewed and updated at least annually to comply with applicable Federal, State, and local emergency preparedness requirements. In an interview, the Administrator acknowledged that the facility’s Emergency Management Plan had not been reviewed or updated. No documentation was provided to show that the required annual review and update of the EP plan had occurred. The deficiency is based solely on the lack of documented annual review and update of the emergency preparedness plan by facility administration; no specific resident cases or clinical events were described in the report.
Plan Of Correction
Preparation and/or execution of the Plan of Correction does not constitute admission or agreement of the provider of the truth of the facts alleged or conclusions set forth in the statement of deficiencies. The Plan of Correction is prepared and/or executed solely because it is required by the provision of Federal and State law. Facility EP was reviewed and signed off on by the DON, Maintenance Director and Administrator. The facility has determined that all residents have the potential to be affected. An in-service education program will be conducted by the administrator. The administrator will conduct monthly random checks to verify completed documentation.
Improper Repair of Smoke Barrier Penetrations in Multiple Smoke Compartments
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors identified a deficiency in the facility’s maintenance of smoke/fire-rated enclosures, specifically related to penetrations in smoke barriers in multiple smoke compartments. During an interview, the Maintenance Director reported that insulation was used to pack holes and then covered with fiberglass in general storage rooms in smoke compartments 1, 2, and 3, but was unable to confirm whether these materials were approved for use in fire-rated walls. Subsequent observation showed that the penetrations were indeed covered with fiberglass, and one general storage room in smoke compartment 2 had a hole in one of the fiberglass panels. The report states that this failure to properly maintain penetrations through smoke/fire-rated construction could allow smoke and flammable gases to spread to other areas and cause the smoke/fire-rated construction to fail to perform as designed.
Failure to Maintain and Inspect Patient-Care Electrical Equipment
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors identified a deficiency in the facility’s compliance with NFPA 99 requirements for testing and maintaining fixed patient-care electrical equipment. During an observation in one resident room, the bedside remote was found to have two different types of insulation and exposed wiring. In another resident room, the call button receptacle was observed with exposed low-voltage conductors. These conditions were noted during a survey of two of six smoke compartments. During an interview conducted at the time of the observations, the Maintenance Director stated that the facility had just received a new shipment of bed remotes and had not yet replaced the existing ones. The Maintenance Director also acknowledged the issue with the exposed conductors at the call button receptacle. The surveyors cited this as a failure to properly inspect and maintain fixed patient care electrical equipment in accordance with NFPA 99 (2012 Edition), sections 10.3 and 10.5.2.1.
Widespread Odors and Environmental Disrepair in Resident Care Areas
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors identified that the facility failed to provide a safe, clean, comfortable, and homelike environment as required by 42 CFR 483.10(i). Upon entrance to the building on multiple days, surveyors noted a strong, pungent odor of urine and feces throughout the facility, with the odor particularly strong on the 200, 300, and 400 halls. Staff interviews confirmed that the building "usually smells like" urine, and staff attributed the odor to residents defecating and urinating on the floor, an old building structure, and cleaning products that sanitize but do not deodorize. Housekeeping staff reported that they clean resident rooms daily but that nursing staff must first clean fecal and urine waste before housekeeping can sanitize, and delays by nursing staff in doing so postponed housekeeping’s ability to address the odors. On the 300 unit, surveyors observed multiple environmental and sanitation issues in resident rooms and bathrooms. The hallway had torn flooring, food particles, and a butter knife on the floor. Individual rooms had food debris, a straw on the floor, and broken blinds. Bathrooms contained dark brown stains on walls, rusted ceiling tile trim, toilets with brownish substances inside, and wet floors around toilets. Trim was missing around toilet bases, exposing a black, mold-like substance. Corroded and rusted sink faucet handles, leaking faucets, rusted pipes under sinks with buildup of corrosion, and rusted sprinklers were observed. Some toilets and three-in-one commodes had duct tape on them, and bathroom walls had black, mold-like substances. Doors and door facings showed rust, scrape marks, chipped and peeling paint, and exposed wood. In some rooms, electrical outlets had no covers while oxygen concentrators were plugged into them, boards covered windows, light fixtures over beds lacked covers with sockets exposed, and one fixture had only one bulb. A resident bed appeared dirty with a black substance on it, and dresser drawers were broken with drawer fronts on the floor. On the 400 unit, surveyors again noted a strong odor of urine upon entry and found additional environmental deficiencies. Bathrooms had missing ceiling tiles, broken emergency light covers with no pull strings, and toilet tank covers that did not fit properly, exposing the inside of the tank. In one bathroom, torn toilet paper and used briefs were lying in the corner of the floor, and toilets had brown, rust-like substances inside the bowls. Door facings appeared cracked with brown substances along the sides, and toilets had brownish-black buildup around the bases with broken, peeling trim. Light bases on walls had rust-like appearances, multiple rooms had broken or missing blinds, and some outlets lacked covers while oxygen concentrators were plugged into them. Some rooms had unmade beds, exposed wires at outlets, toilets with dark brown-black rings around the base and flooring, uncovered light fixtures, leaking sinks with rusted pipes, loose flooring, loose toilet seats, and dry red substances on door frames. Surveyors also observed deficiencies in the outdoor patio area adjacent to the locked unit. The gate code was broken, and a resident lock was placed on the gate. The patio and surrounding fencing had fallen palm fronds on the grass, broken and rotted wooden fence railings, unsteady railings, and multiple exposed rusted nails protruding from the railings where boards were broken or detached. Overgrown trees and bushes from the perimeter extended through the fence railings. When asked, the Administrator acknowledged that the area was not safe for residents and stated that they planned to have it redone in the future. The Maintenance Director reported that he and one other maintenance person relied on work orders and verbal reports to identify needed repairs and stated he was not aware of the specific room and equipment issues on the 300 and 400 units. Housekeeping staff stated they would report broken items via a work order book or text to maintenance, but one housekeeper, who cleaned the 400 unit daily, denied noticing stains or biohazard-like materials on walls and door frames despite the surveyors’ observations. Review of facility documents showed that the housekeeper job description required staff to maintain assigned work areas in a clean, safe, comfortable, and attractive manner and to report maintenance problems noted during cleaning. A facility policy titled "Policies and Practices - Control" stated that the facility must maintain a safe, sanitary, and comfortable environment for personnel, residents, visitors, and the public. The DON stated that blinds had been changed out and new cabinets and door handles purchased, and that staff were directed to use standard precautions when cleaning rooms, but also stated there was no policy specific to cleaning the environment. These observations and interviews demonstrated that the facility did not maintain sanitary, orderly, and comfortable interior conditions, did not adequately control offensive odors, and did not ensure that the physical environment, including resident rooms, bathrooms, and outdoor areas, was maintained in a safe, clean, and homelike condition as required by regulation.
Failure to Report Elopement Incident Involving Law Enforcement
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to report an elopement incident to required state and federal agencies as mandated by 42 CFR 483.12(c). On the referenced date, Resident #5 exited the building through his bedroom window around 12:15 PM and walked across the facility property toward the perimeter fence. A CNA observed the resident outside and called for assistance, after which staff redirected and escorted the resident back into the building and placed him on one-to-one supervision. The facility’s internal incident documentation noted the window exit and subsequent maintenance inspection of the window seals but did not include any staff or witness statements. The DON later stated that the resident never left facility grounds and was returned without injury, and therefore the incident was not considered reportable. However, interviews and external records showed that the resident did leave the facility premises and that law enforcement was involved. Resident #5 recalled being outside the facility, being brought back by staff and a “police man,” and being told by the officer not to leave again. A police report from the local police department confirmed an encounter with the resident outside the facility and that an officer assisted staff in escorting him back. Maintenance staff (Staff G) also reported that the resident climbed out the window, left the facility property, and was stopped “down the road,” then redirected back with law enforcement assistance. In interviews, the DON initially denied that law enforcement had been notified or involved, then later acknowledged that law enforcement had responded but asserted they did not come into the facility. The DON also confirmed awareness that any incident in which law enforcement investigates or responds is required to be reported, yet the elopement and law enforcement involvement were not reported to the State Survey Agency or other required officials within the required time frames.
Failure to Provide Timely ADL and Hygiene Care to a Dependent Resident
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors found that the facility failed to provide necessary ADL care, including grooming and hygiene, to a dependent resident over multiple days. The resident was repeatedly observed in visibly soiled clothing with a strong odor of urine, first standing in his doorway holding onto a wheelchair with wet navy pants saturated down to his calves, stating he had been waiting for staff to change his clothes. More than an hour later the same day, he remained in the same soiled pants and shirt while seated in a wheelchair near the nurses’ station. The following day, he was again observed wearing the same soiled clothes, smelling of urine, with his shirt stained with food and a dark liquid. His room had a strong urine odor, his bed was soiled with urine, and only two pairs of pants were seen on a chair with no other clothing available in the room. On a subsequent observation, he was seated on the edge of his bed wearing different pants and no shirt, with yellow-stained sheets beneath him and his previously soiled clothes on the floor; he reported that he had requested assistance but no staff had come, so he changed himself. Record review showed the resident had a history of stroke and repeated unspecified conditions, with a recent Quarterly MDS indicating moderate cognitive impairment (BIMS score of 10). The MDS documented him as independent for toileting, showering, personal hygiene, and related ADLs, and only occasionally incontinent, but his care plan did not specify the level of assistance he required for incontinence care and other ADLs. In contrast, an LPN familiar with the resident stated he required staff assistance with bathing, grooming, toileting, and care, and that he did not refuse such assistance and appropriately requested help. The LPN also explained that personal clothing was laundered at the facility and left bagged in the linen room for nursing staff to distribute, rather than being returned directly to resident rooms. The DON stated that staff were expected to follow best practices, including rounding every two hours and as needed to keep residents clean and dry, and acknowledged that all residents required some level of assistance with ADLs. The DON further stated the facility had no written ADL, resident care, or quality of care policies, despite these expectations.
Unsecured Storage of Full Oxygen Cylinders on Nursing Unit
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors found that the facility failed to ensure safe storage of oxygen cylinders on the West 1 unit. At 9:03 a.m., four full oxygen cylinders were observed stored unsecured directly on the ground rather than in the designated secured cylinder storage rack, under a sign labeled "FULL CYLINDERS." Photographic evidence was obtained of this condition. At 9:18 a.m., the ADON confirmed that the four cylinders were full and acknowledged they should not be stored on the ground. Review of NFPA 99 (2021) 11.6.2.3(11) indicated that cylinders must be protected from damage and that freestanding cylinders must be properly chained or supported in a proper stand or cart. Later that day, the DON stated that oxygen cylinders should be stored in a secure rack and never directly on the ground, and acknowledged that unsecured cylinders on the floor were a safety risk. The Maintenance Director also confirmed that oxygen cylinders should be in a secure rack and never stored directly on the ground, stating that cylinders stored on the floor can tip over and cause damage. These observations and interviews demonstrated noncompliance with regulatory and NFPA standards for safe storage of oxygen cylinders.
Plan Of Correction
This plan of correction constitutes a written allegation of compliance for the deficiency cited. Submission of this plan of correction is not an admission that the deficiency exists or that one was cited correctly. This plan of correction is submitted to meet the requirements established by the State and Federal law. The four unsecured [R] cylinders on the West 1 unit were secured. The Nursing Department completed a baseline audit of [R] cylinder storage within the facility to ensure all [R] cylinders were secured and stored properly. Ongoing education will be completed with current facility staff regarding the facility's [R] storage policy and procedure; and will be completed during new hire and agency orientation to the facility by ADON/designee. Audits will be completed by the Director of Nursing/designee regarding adherence to the facility's [R] storage policy and procedure twice weekly x 4 weeks, then weekly x 4 weeks, then monthly x 4 months, or until continued substantial compliance has been met. Results of audits will be reported to the QAPI Committee on a monthly basis by the Director of Nursing/designee.
Failure to Provide Required CPR and Activate EMS for Full Code Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide immediate and appropriate basic life support, including CPR, to a resident with a documented full code status when the resident was found unresponsive. The resident had diagnoses including a slow-progressing circulatory condition involving narrowing or blockage of vessels, a condition that restricts airflow and makes breathing difficult, and other listed conditions. The physician’s order specified “Full Code,” and the care plan documented that the resident was under court-ordered guardianship with wishes honored as full code. The facility’s policy required that in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest, staff immediately call for assistance, overhead page a code, begin CPR in the absence of a valid DNR, and continue CPR until EMS assumes responsibility or the resident responds. On the night of the incident at approximately 2:00–2:07 a.m., a CNA found the resident unresponsive in bed and notified the RN on duty. One CNA’s written statement indicated that the RN said she already knew the resident was going to die and instructed the CNA to clean and cover the resident. Another CNA’s account stated that the RN came to the room, took vital signs, and then instructed her to clean the resident. The RN’s own written statement and interview indicated that she called a code blue, that an LPN brought the crash cart, and that they performed CPR for approximately 20 minutes. The LPN’s statement corroborated that a code blue was called, that he brought the crash cart, and that CPR was performed for about 20 minutes before the RN stopped and stated that the resident was gone or words to that effect. The RN acknowledged that the resident had no vital signs but was warm and not responding, and she stated that she believed the resident was on hospice and therefore did not call 911. After CPR was discontinued, the RN did not activate EMS and instead notified the DON, the provider, and the resident’s family. The DON documented receiving a message from the RN that the resident had no pulse and no blood pressure and that the assigned nurse had initiated CPR but was unable to revive the resident. The DON later received a text from the RN that the resident had expired. The DON stated that at approximately 6:00 a.m. she called the facility and asked if 911 had been called, and upon learning it had not, she instructed the RN to call 911. The RN then reinitiated CPR at around 6:00 a.m., approximately four hours after the resident was first found without pulse or respirations, and stated that they tried to do something until EMS arrived because EMS had to see them doing CPR. EMS records showed activation at 6:18 a.m., arrival at 6:27 a.m., and pronouncement of death at 6:31 a.m., with documentation that CPR was not attempted by EMS because it was considered futile and that the resident exhibited postmortem changes. The Medical Director confirmed that the resident was full code and stated that staff should have started CPR and called 911 and that CPR should not be done four hours after a resident is pronounced dead. The facility’s investigation and a root cause analysis concluded that the RN and LPN did not follow the facility’s established policy and procedure to call 911 and administer CPR to a full code resident until EMS arrival. The root cause was identified as the nurse’s belief that the resident was on hospice and her failure to check the resident’s code status as outlined in facility policy. The surveyors determined that the failure to immediately activate EMS and to continue CPR until EMS arrival for this full code resident constituted noncompliance with the requirement to provide basic life support and resulted in an Immediate Jeopardy determination.
Plan Of Correction
This plan of correction is submitted as required under Federal and State regulations and statutes applicable to long term care providers. This plan of correction does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of the facility, and such liability is hereby specifically denied. The submission of this plan does not constitute agreement by the facility that the surveyors' findings or conclusions are accurate, that the findings constitute a deficiency, or that the scope or severity regarding any of these deficiencies cited are correctly applied. Resident #1 no longer resides in the facility as of 4.7.26. This has the potential to affect all residents in the facility. All codes to 1.1.26 were reviewed to ensure protocol was followed. No outliers were noted. All licensed nurses received education from the Director of Nursing and/or nursing management on [R] policy and procedure and Florida [R] policy. This includes where to find the code status. Education addressed what to do for full code hospice residents. Education completed with CNA's that protocol is that they do not assist with [R] or breaths during a [R] event. All education will be added to new hire orientation. Code drills will occur 3 x weekly x 4 weeks, followed by 2 x weekly x 4 weeks, followed by 1 x weekly x 4 weeks. Results will be brought to QAPI to determine need for ongoing auditing.
Removal Plan
- Educated licensed nurses on CPR policy and procedure and Florida Do Not Resuscitate (DNRO) policy, including where to find code status and what to do for full code hospice residents; emphasized initiating emergency services immediately when resident is full code, continuing CPR until EMS arrives, and that nurses cannot pronounce death or stop CPR on a full code resident unless instructed by EMS.
- Implemented emergency response “Code Blue” drills on all three shifts, including full code and full code hospice scenarios, with emphasis on calling 911 immediately.
- Educated licensed nurses and CNAs on the facility abuse and neglect policy, including resident rights.
- Required licensed nurses to complete a CPR post-test; restricted staff who have not completed education/testing from working until completion.
- Educated licensed nurses regarding change in condition.
- Placed laminated instructions on how to overhead page during a code at all nursing station phones and other designated phones.
- Held a Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review root cause analysis findings and approve recommendations.
- Held a Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review progress of the plan and approve recommendations.
- Completed a “like resident” audit of all expired residents and rehospitalizations for a defined period to determine whether involved staff were the same as the code event and whether proper procedure was followed.
Failure to Provide Competent CPR Response and Verify Code Status for Full Code Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure that nursing staff possessed and demonstrated the competencies required to respond appropriately to a cardiopulmonary emergency for a resident with full code status. Resident #1, who was designated as full code, was found unresponsive and without respirations or pulse at approximately 2:07 a.m. Clinical staff, consisting of an RN (Staff A) and an LPN (Staff B), initiated CPR but did not activate Emergency Medical Services (EMS) as required by facility policy for a full code resident. After approximately 20 minutes of CPR, the RN and LPN stopped resuscitation efforts without EMS involvement. The RN, without authority to do so, pronounced the resident deceased based on the absence of vital signs and did not verify the resident’s code status before discontinuing CPR. The RN later stated she believed the resident was on hospice and therefore did not call 911, and that she was confused about which residents were hospice and which were full code. The LPN reported that he assumed the RN had called 911 and continued CPR for about 20 minutes until the RN “called the code” and left, and he acknowledged that he knew CPR should continue until EMS arrival but did not speak up. Four hours after CPR was stopped, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the RN restarted CPR and activated EMS after receiving instructions from the DON. The investigation further identified that the RN had no documented orientation, onboarding education, or skills competency assessments since hire, despite being promoted to weekend supervisor. Her BLS certification had been obtained through a fully online course without an instructor or live feedback. The LPN’s BLS certification was expired, and a CNA who performed several chest compressions also had an expired BLS certification, even though facility policy did not permit CNAs to perform CPR. Facility records showed that monthly code blue drills had been conducted, but there was no documentation that the RN had ever participated in these drills. Leadership interviews confirmed that required clinical orientation and competency evaluations had not been completed for the RN, and that she had failed tests for a clinical manager position but was nonetheless functioning in a supervisory role. These actions and omissions led surveyors to determine that staff were not adequately trained or competent to respond to cardiopulmonary arrest for residents with full code status, resulting in an Immediate Jeopardy determination. The facility’s own root cause analysis, as reflected in meeting minutes, identified that the nurse did not check the resident’s code status and lacked knowledge about when CPR could be discontinued and when 911 should be called. The analysis documented that the nurse believed the resident was hospice and therefore did not start or continue CPR appropriately or call EMS when the resident was found without respirations and pulse. The facility assessment tool and policies referenced the need for staff training and competencies in identifying changes in condition, end-of-life care, advance care planning, and adherence to the CPR policy, but the documented events showed that these expectations were not met in practice for the staff involved in this incident. Surveyors concluded that the failure to ensure nursing staff were trained and competent to respond appropriately to cardiopulmonary arrest for a full code resident, including immediate initiation and continuation of CPR and activation of EMS, constituted noncompliance with requirements for sufficient and competent nursing staff. The failure affected Resident #1 and placed other full code residents at risk, leading to an Immediate Jeopardy finding that was later reduced in scope and severity after verification of an acceptable Immediate Jeopardy removal plan.
Plan Of Correction
This plan of correction is submitted as required under Federal and State regulations and statutes applicable to long term care providers. This plan of correction does not constitute an admission of liability on the part of the facility, and such liability is hereby specifically denied. The submission of this plan does not constitute agreement by the facility that the surveyors' findings or conclusions are accurate, that the findings constitute a deficiency, or that the scope or severity regarding any of these deficiencies cited are correctly applied Resident # 1 no longer resides in the facility as of 4.7.26. This has the potential to affect all residents in the facility. All licensed nurses were audited to ensure current [R] certification. Facility will ensure [R] certification through a [R] provider whose training includes a [R] on session either in a physical or virtual instructor-led setting in accordance with accepted national standards. Human resources, or designee, will audit monthly to ensure all licensed nurses have a current [R] certification.Education was completed with licensed nurses on initiating [R] services immediately when a resident is full code. Education included that [R] is to continue on a full code resident until [R] arrives and that the nurse cannot pronounce [R] on the full code resident and/or stop [R] until instructed by [R].Education will be added to new hire orientation.7 random licensed nurses will complete a knowledge quiz related to code events. Per week x 4 weeks, followed by 5 nurses x 4 weeks, then 3 nurses x 4 weeks. Results will be brought to QAPI to determine need for ongoing auditing.
Removal Plan
- Regional Director of Clinical Services educated the Administrator and Director of Nursing regarding the CPR policy and the need to immediately contact emergency medical services (911) in the event of a full code; Administrator and DON signed the education
- Regional Director of Clinical Services provided documented education to the Administrator and Director of Nursing regarding the CPR policy and the need to immediately contact emergency medical services (911) in the event of a full code
- Director of Nursing and/or nursing management educated all licensed nurses on the CPR policy and procedure, including where to find code status and what to do for full code hospice residents
- Reinforced through education that CPR must be initiated immediately for full code residents, continued until EMS arrives, and that nurses cannot pronounce death or stop CPR on a full code resident unless instructed by EMS
- Conducted an Ad Hoc Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review root cause analysis recommendations related to the incident; recommendations approved
- Conducted a follow-up Ad Hoc Quality Improvement Performance Committee meeting to review progress on the plan; recommendations approved
Improper Use of Power Strips and Extension Cords in Multiple Facility Areas
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors identified deficiencies related to the use and maintenance of relocatable power taps (RPTs) and extension cords that did not comply with NFPA 101, NFPA 99, and NFPA 70 requirements. During a facility tour conducted between 11:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. with the Maintenance Director, surveyors observed in the social services office an RPT plugged into another RPT, which was then plugged into a wall outlet, with the cord running across a walkway and taped to the floor. In the multipurpose room, a television was found plugged into an extension cord, contrary to standards that prohibit using extension cords as a substitute for fixed wiring and require temporary extensions to be removed immediately after use. Further observations included the MDS office, where an RPT was plugged into another RPT and an outlet adapter was in use. These configurations did not meet the NFPA 99 provisions governing the proper use of power strips and extension cords, including requirements that power strips be appropriately rated and used only as intended, and that extension cords not be used as permanent wiring. During concurrent interviews, the Maintenance Director acknowledged these findings as they were observed by the surveyors.
Plan Of Correction
The RPT observed plugged into an RPT plugged into an outlet in the Social Services Office was removed. The extension cord used to plug in the television in the multipurpose room was removed. The RPT plugged into an RPT and outlet adapter in the MDS office was removed. Additional offices and resident care areas will be reviewed for the improper use of plug adapters, power strips and extension. The Executive Director/designee will educate the Maintenance Director on the importance of NFPA 101 Electrical Equipment- Power and Extension specific to the improper use of plug adapters, power strips, and extension and will continue to monitor in accordance with NFPA standards. Any findings will be reported to the monthly QAPI Committee for further review. The RPT observed plugged into an RPT plugged into an outlet in the Social Services Office was removed. The extension cord used to plug in the television in the multipurpose room was removed. The RPT plugged into an RPT and outlet adapter in the MDS office was removed. Additional offices and resident care areas will be reviewed for the improper use of plug adapters, power strips and extension. The Executive Director/designee will educate the Maintenance Director on the importance of NFPA 101 Electrical Equipment - Power and Extension specific to the improper use of plug adapters, power strips, and extension and will continue to monitor in accordance with NFPA standards. Any findings will be reported to the monthly QAPI Committee for further review.
Trusted data from CMS and state health departments
Every citation, penalty and Plan of Correction is sourced from public CMS records (latest release June 24, 2026) and official state health department websites — never guesswork.
Some of the Latest Corrective Actions taken by Facilities in Florida
- Implemented a revised admission/readmission process requiring completion of an Advance Directive discussion form by a licensed nurse upon admission or with change in advance directives, with Social Services follow-up (J - F0578 - FL) (J - F0578 - FL)
- Reviewed Advance Directive discussion forms in daily clinical meetings with the Interdisciplinary Team and conducted post-meeting unit huddles to communicate code-status/advance-directive changes (J - F0578 - FL)
- Implemented an “It Takes Two” process requiring two licensed nurses to verify code status/advance directives prior to initiating CPR (J - F0578 - FL)
- Placed crash-cart signage instructing staff to stop and check the physician order prior to starting CPR (J - F0578 - FL)
- Implemented Emergency Response Binders with Florida DNRO forms (for applicable residents), a DNRO verification checklist, and a code-status reference guide, and placed them at designated locations (J - F0678 - FL) (J - F0578 - FL)
- Established designated locations for goldenrod (yellow) paper for printing Florida DNRO forms and educated staff on where to find it (J - F0678 - FL) (J - F0578 - FL)
- Implemented a Florida DNRO form admission/readmission checklist to verify required signatures, proxy authority, proper completion, and physical availability of the DNRO form (J - F0578 - FL)
- Assigned Human Resources to monitor licensed nurses’ CPR cards for ongoing active certification and to verify CPR certification for newly hired licensed nurses (J - F0678 - FL)
- Implemented a requirement that all new employees participated in a Code Blue drill upon hire (J - F0726 - FL)
- Implemented a requirement that licensed nurses did not work prior to attending a mock Code Blue quality assurance drill (J - F0578 - FL) (J - F0726 - FL) (J - F0600 - FL)
- Implemented a requirement that licensed nursing staff signed an Honoring Advance Directive Attestation upon hire (J - F0726 - FL) (J - F0600 - FL)
- Conducted ongoing Code Blue drills on each shift with results reviewed in QAPI meetings to determine need for further drills and/or education (J - F0678 - FL)
- Held ongoing monthly QAPI meetings to review and revise education, audits, code blue drills, and post-tests as indicated (J - F0678 - FL) (J - F0578 - FL)
- Implemented Director of Clinical Services chart review of residents who expired at the facility or were transferred to the hospital after a cardiac event to verify advance directives were followed (J - F0578 - FL)
- Educated licensed/certified staff on medical emergency response and communication of advance directives/code status, following physician orders related to advance directives, the “It Takes Two” verification process, and CNA roles during code blue (J - F0578 - FL)
- Educated licensed nurses on CPR policy/procedure, Advanced Directives policy/procedure, and Abuse/Neglect (with post-testing and required passing scores) (J - F0678 - FL) (J - F0600 - FL)
- Educated licensed nurses on Resident Rights related to Advance Directives, verification of code status/advance directives, DNR orders, Florida DNRO requirements, CPR/EMS response requirements, and EMR documentation (with post-testing) (J - F0678 - FL) (J - F0578 - FL)
- Educated all employees on Abuse and Neglect policy/procedure (including reporting requirements) (J - F0600 - FL)
- Educated facility staff on Resident Rights and Abuse/Neglect and Exploitation with emphasis on honoring advance directives (J - F0578 - FL) (J - F0726 - FL) (J - F0600 - FL)
- Educated licensed staff on honoring advance directives, physician orders, timeliness of initiating CPR, and the Code Blue process (J - F0726 - FL) (J - F0600 - FL)
Failure to Verify and Honor DNR Order Before Initiating CPR
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to honor a resident’s clearly established Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) status during a cardiac emergency. The resident had multiple medical diagnoses, including cerebral infarction, COPD, cardiomyopathy, atherosclerotic heart disease, a nonrheumatic mitral valve disorder, cognitive communication deficit, and immunodeficiency. The medical record contained DNR orders created on two separate dates with no end dates, a DNR document signed by the resident and a nurse practitioner, and a 3008 form listing the resident’s advance directive as DNR. The resident’s MDS showed a Brief Interview for Mental Status score of 15, indicating intact cognition, and progress notes documented that the difference between DNR/no CPR and full code had been explained over 30 minutes, after which the resident chose DNR and reiterated to social services that she did not want to be resuscitated or undergo chest compressions. On the day of the incident, a CNA assigned to the resident checked on her and found her sitting in a wheelchair and unresponsive despite multiple verbal attempts to rouse her. The CNA notified the RN, who obtained a blood pressure machine, entered the room, then ran out to the nurses’ station, after which a code blue was paged over the intercom. The RN returned with a crash cart, and additional nursing staff, including RNs and LPNs, entered the room. Staff described transferring the unresponsive resident from the wheelchair to the bed and beginning chest compressions. Multiple staff members reported that when one LPN asked about the resident’s code status, no one in the room knew it at that time, and that this LPN left the room to verify the code status while CPR was already in progress. Interviews and video review confirmed that CPR was initiated and continued for approximately 12 minutes before EMS arrived, despite the resident’s existing DNR orders. Several nurses, including those who arrived after CPR had started, acknowledged that they did not check the resident’s code status before assisting with chest compressions or using a bag-valve mask. Staff later reported that the LPN who checked the record returned and announced that the resident was a DNR, yet compressions continued until EMS arrived. The physician stated that the resident was already in the system as a DNR and that staff were expected to check code status before performing CPR. The DON and regional nurse consultant confirmed, based on interviews and camera review, that staff failed to confirm the resident’s code status prior to initiating CPR and that CPR was performed against the resident’s wishes, leading surveyors to determine that this failure resulted in Immediate Jeopardy.
Removal Plan
- Implemented a revised admission/readmission process requiring an Advance Directive discussion form to be completed by the licensed nurse upon admission or with change in advance directives, with follow-up by Social Services.
- Reviewed Advance Directive discussion forms in the daily clinical meeting with the Interdisciplinary Team.
- Conducted a huddle on units after the clinical meeting to discuss any changes in advance directives/code status.
- Placed signage on each crash cart stating: "Stop check physician order prior to starting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation."
- Implemented the "It Takes Two" process requiring two licensed nurses to verify code status/advance directives prior to initiation of CPR.
- Initiated an internal investigation including resident record review, staff interviews, and notification to the physician and resident representative.
- Suspended and terminated the assigned nurse and reported the nurse’s license to the licensing board.
- Suspended and terminated an additional nurse who responded and participated in initiation of CPR and reported the nurse’s license to the licensing board.
- Suspended two additional nurses pending investigation and returned them to work with disciplinary action, education on ANE/honoring advance directives, and participation in a code blue drill.
- Conducted a 100% audit of all current residents’ code status and care plans.
- Conducted a 100% audit of crash carts to ensure all required items were present.
- Reviewed CPR cards for identified nurses to confirm validity and inclusion of in-person skills competencies.
- Held an ad hoc QAPI meeting with Administrator, DON, Medical Director, and department heads.
- Completed an audit of residents discharged, transferred to the hospital, or expired to verify advance directives were honored.
- Provided staff education for licensed/certified staff on medical emergency response and communication of advance directives and code status, following physician orders related to advance directives, the "It Takes Two" verification process, and CNA roles during code blue.
- Provided all-staff education on Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation/Resident Rights with focus on honoring advance directives.
- Completed honoring advance directives attestation with licensed nursing staff.
- Completed physician orders education for licensed nursing staff.
- Completed medical emergency response and communication of code status education for licensed nursing staff.
- Completed ANE/Resident Rights education for all staff.
- Completed advance directives posttest for licensed staff.
- Completed ANE/Resident Rights posttest for all staff.
- Completed code blue process/"It Takes Two" education for licensed nursing staff.
- Began code blue drills every shift and required licensed nurses to attend a mock code blue quality assurance drill prior to working.
- Completed CNA roles-in-code-blue training.
- Completed quality reviews validating staff competencies for completed education.
- Completed quality reviews of newly admitted residents to verify completion of the advance directive discussion form.
- Implemented Director of Clinical Services chart review of residents who expire at the facility or are transferred to the hospital after a cardiac event to verify advance directives were followed.
Failure to Honor Full Code Status and Initiate CPR for Unresponsive Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide basic life support/CPR in accordance with a resident’s documented full code status and physician orders. Facility policy required that CPR be provided to all residents in cardiac arrest unless there was a fully executed DNR order, and that in the absence of such an order, the nurse must immediately begin CPR and continue until EMS assumed responsibility. The policy also required two nurses to verify resident identification and the presence of a fully executed DNR order in the advanced directive section of the medical record. In this case, the resident had a care plan and a physician’s order specifying full code status, and there was no documentation of a DNR order. Record review showed that the resident was cognitively intact, required substantial/maximal assistance with ADLs, had a tracheostomy and a feeding tube, and was receiving hospice services. The hospice nurse reported that the resident was alert, oriented, and personally chose to be full code, and that hospice honored residents’ decisions to remain full code. Despite this, when the resident was found unresponsive, the required verification of code status and initiation of CPR did not occur. A CNA working the night shift found the resident unresponsive at the start of her shift and immediately notified the RN assigned to the resident, then continued her rounds. The assigned RN stated that upon being notified, she assessed the resident around 11:15 PM, found no breathing and no vital signs, but did not check the chart for code status and did not initiate CPR or call 911. She reported that she assumed the resident was DNR because the resident was on hospice, and instead called the physician, who told her to call hospice, and then she called hospice. A progress note later documented that the resident was found with no chest rise and no vital signs, hospice was called, a hospice nurse was dispatched, and post-mortem care was provided. Another RN on the same shift stated that when he returned from break around 12:30 AM, he saw a hospice chaplain at the nurses’ station and observed the first RN charting; when told the resident had died, he saw on the computer that the resident was full code and informed the first RN of this, but he did not report the situation to anyone and continued his shift. The facility later identified that no CPR or emergency services were initiated for a resident with a full code order, and the resident died. The facility determined that Immediate Jeopardy began when the resident was found unresponsive and no CPR was initiated, and that the noncompliance involved failure to follow the advanced directive and CPR policies and procedures. Interviews with leadership confirmed that the expectation was for licensed nurses to follow facility policy and perform CPR in the absence of DNR orders, and that in this incident, those expectations were not met. The root cause analysis identified failure to follow the Advanced Directive Policy and Procedure as the cause of the noncompliance.
Removal Plan
- Provided individualized training to the involved registered nurse on the Florida Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) Policy with emphasis on steps to take when a resident is unresponsive.
- Suspended the involved registered nurse pending investigation.
- Terminated the involved registered nurse’s employment.
- Verified that current licensed nurses have active BLS/CPR certification cards.
- Completed code blue drills, education, and post-testing for licensed nurses to validate understanding and competency.
- Completed an audit of Advanced Directive Discussion forms to ensure resident code status reflects and honors resident wishes.
- Held an ad hoc QAPI Committee meeting to review root cause analysis recommendations (including Medical Director participation) and obtained committee approval of recommendations.
- Developed and initiated a Performance Improvement Plan based on the root cause analysis, identifying failure to follow the Advanced Directive Policy and Procedure.
- Initiated code drills and continued until all current nursing staff participated.
- Provided education to the second nurse who identified the code status regarding the importance of reporting the incident to facility administration.
- Provided licensed nurse education on CPR Policy/Procedure, Advanced Directives Policy/Procedure, and Abuse/Neglect, with post-testing and required passing scores.
- Continued Code Blue Drills on each shift, with results reviewed in QAPI meetings to determine need for further drills and/or education.
- Assigned the Human Resources Generalist to monitor licensed nurses’ CPR cards to ensure active CPR certification and to verify CPR certification for all newly hired licensed nurses.
Failure to Honor Full Code Status and Initiate CPR for Hospice Resident
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to honor a resident’s full code status and to provide ordered emergency care/CPR when the resident was found unresponsive. The resident was cognitively intact, had a tracheostomy and a feeding tube, required substantial/maximal assistance with activities of daily living, and was receiving hospice services. The resident’s care plan and physician’s orders documented an advanced directive of full code. Despite this, when the resident was found without chest rise and without vital signs, no CPR or emergency services were initiated. On the night of the incident, a CNA working the 11P–7A shift found the resident unresponsive during initial rounds and immediately notified the RN assigned to the resident. The CNA then continued with her rounds. The RN assessed the resident, determined that the resident was not breathing and had no vital signs, but did not check the resident’s chart or electronic record for code status. The RN assumed the resident was a DNR because the resident was on hospice, and therefore did not initiate CPR or call 911. Instead, the RN called the physician, who instructed her to call hospice, and hospice was notified. A hospice nurse was dispatched, and post-mortem care was provided. The RN documented that the resident was found with no chest rising and no vital signs, that hospice was called, and that post-mortem care was provided, but did not document any attempt at CPR. Another RN on the same 7P–7A shift returned from break around 12:30 AM and saw a hospice chaplain at the nurses’ station and the first RN charting. When he inquired, he was told that the resident had died. He observed on the computer screen that the resident was a full code and informed the first RN of this. Despite recognizing that the resident was a full code, he did not report the situation to anyone, continued his shift, and left the facility without notifying administration. The facility’s Regional Nurse Consultant later discovered, during chart audits of discharged residents, that no CPR had been performed on a resident with full code status and notified the Administrator. The Administrator, who also served as Abuse Coordinator, confirmed with the first RN that CPR and 911 had not been initiated. The facility’s abuse and neglect policy defined neglect as failure to provide necessary goods and services to avoid physical harm, pain, mental anguish, or emotional distress, and included failure to report observed or suspected abuse or neglect as an example of neglect. The failure to perform CPR on a full-code resident and the failure of staff to report the incident to administration were identified as neglect. The Immediate Jeopardy began when the resident was found unresponsive and no CPR or emergency services were initiated, despite the resident’s documented full code status. The facility’s own review and interviews established that the RN responsible for the resident did not verify code status and acted on an assumption based solely on the resident’s hospice enrollment. Additionally, the second RN, after learning that the deceased resident was a full code, did not report the occurrence to administration or take further action. These inactions, in the context of the facility’s abuse and neglect policy and the resident’s clearly documented wishes and orders, led to the determination of neglect and Immediate Jeopardy related to failure to provide basic life support according to physician’s orders and advanced directives.
Removal Plan
- Provided individualized training to the involved registered nurse on the Florida Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Policy, emphasizing steps to take when a resident is unresponsive.
- Suspended the involved registered nurse pending investigation.
- Terminated the involved registered nurse’s employment.
- Verified all current licensed nurses have active BLS/CPR certification cards.
- Conducted code blue drills, education, and post-testing for all licensed nurses.
- Completed an audit of Advanced Directive Discussion forms to ensure resident code status reflects and honors resident wishes.
- Held an ad hoc QAPI Committee meeting to review root cause analysis recommendations.
- Developed and initiated a Performance Improvement Plan based on the root cause analysis identifying failure to follow the Advanced Directive Policy and Procedure.
- Initiated code drills until all current nursing staff participated.
- Provided education to the second nurse who identified the code status regarding the importance of reporting the incident to facility administration.
- Initiated licensed nurse education on CPR policy and procedure, Advanced Directives policy and procedure, Abuse and Neglect, and the requirement to report neglect to administration, with post-testing and participation in code blue drills to validate competency.
- Educated all employees on the Abuse and Neglect policy and procedure, including reporting requirements.
Failure to Properly Enter and Process STAT Lab Orders Resulting in Delayed or Missed Diagnostics
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to properly enter and process STAT and routine laboratory orders in the electronic medical record and the external lab portal, resulting in ordered labs not being drawn or not being treated as STAT for multiple residents. For one resident with dementia and hypertension, an ARNP ordered STAT CBC, CMP, chest x‑ray, and other diagnostics after the resident was noted with shortness of breath, labored breathing, and an oxygen saturation of 73% on room air. The LPN caring for the resident stated that the unit manager entered the labs into the lab website, but the lab company reported there was no phone call or requisition ticket for STAT labs and confirmed that no labs were drawn that day. Later that night, another LPN found the resident pale, gasping, with very low respirations and oxygen saturation despite oxygen, and a code blue was initiated with CPR and EMS transfer to the hospital. The PCP and ARNP both stated they were not aware the STAT labs had not been completed and expected the orders to be carried out and results communicated. Another resident with aphasia, hemiplegia, dementia, and a determination of incapacity had orders for CBC and CMP and, per staff and PCP interviews, was to have STAT labs, STAT chest x‑ray, flu and COVID swabs, nebulizer treatments, oxygen, and Ceftriaxone after presenting with fever over 102°F, oxygen saturation of 89%, labored breathing, and crackles in the lungs. The LPN who contacted the PCP reported that all labs and the chest x‑ray were ordered STAT, but the weekend supervisor entered the CBC and CMP as routine labs scheduled for a later date, and flu/COVID tests were not ordered until two days later. The medical record lacked documentation of the change in condition and the STAT nature of the orders on the day they were given. The resident’s labs were ultimately collected later, showing critically high sodium and other abnormal values, and the resident was later sent to the hospital with altered mental status, hypoxia, high fever, and was diagnosed with influenza A, septic shock, and multiorgan failure. A third resident, cognitively intact with diabetes, obesity, hypotension, and a gastrostomy, experienced vomiting, poor intake, and increased confusion. The provider ordered STAT CBC, CMP, and ammonia level for nausea, vomiting, and confusion. One LPN entered the STAT lab orders into the facility charting system while another LPN believed the first nurse would enter the orders into the lab system. The lab later reported that the orders were entered as routine, not STAT, and that while CBC and CMP were drawn and resulted, the ammonia level was not completed due to a specimen issue and was only noted in the portal. A fourth resident with atherosclerotic heart disease, Lewy body neurocognitive disorder, hypertension, and cardiomegaly had an episode of vomiting and chest pain with elevated blood pressure; the NP ordered IM medications, nitroglycerin, and STAT chest x‑ray, CBC, and CMP. The chest x‑ray was completed the same evening, but the CBC and CMP were entered as routine and not drawn until the next morning, with the lab confirming they were not processed as STAT. The DON and PCP acknowledged that the timing between ordering and completion was not acceptable for STAT labs and that there were problems with the lab process and nursing follow‑through on STAT orders.
Removal Plan
- The Director of Nursing was educated by the Regional Nurse Consultant on the process to review clinical records to validate diagnostic testing was completed per provider orders and that providers were notified of results.
- The Director of Nursing reviewed clinical records of current residents with diagnostic test orders from the prior 30 days to validate labs/diagnostic tests were completed as ordered and notified providers of any discrepancies.
- The Assistant Director of Nursing/Staff Development Coordinator began educating licensed nurses on the process to obtain STAT labs from the current lab service.
- The ADON/SDC educated licensed nurses on the process to obtain STAT labs from the current lab service.
- The Staff Development Coordinator began competency validation for licensed nurses on the process for obtaining routine and STAT labs.
- Step-by-step instructions for obtaining labs through the lab website (including STATs) were placed in the front of each lab binder.
- Licensed nurse education on the lab process, provider notification, and documentation was completed for nurses (with sign-in sheets and voice/text education reports used to validate completion).
- An ad hoc QAPI was completed with the Medical Director, Administrator, Director of Nursing, and additional IDT members addressing adherence to policy/process for change in condition, following provider orders, obtaining STAT labs, reviewing diagnostic results, and notifying providers; discussion included provider access to the EMR and ability to view lab/diagnostic results.
Invalid DNRO Led to CPR Against Resident’s Stated DNR Wishes
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure a resident’s Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) wishes were honored due to an invalid Florida Do Not Resuscitate Order (DNRO) form being provided to Emergency Medical Services (EMS). The resident, an elderly male with a history of stroke, type 2 diabetes, heart failure, HIV, coronary artery disease, renal insufficiency, and non-Alzheimer’s dementia, was admitted with a documented DNR order in the electronic medical record (EMR). A hospital transfer form indicated he was alert but disoriented, required a surrogate for decision making, and was a DNR. The EMR contained a Florida DNRO form dated and signed only by the hospital physician, with no signatures from the resident or an authorized representative, and no power of attorney, health care surrogate, or proxy documents were scanned into the EMR. On the morning of the incident, a CNA found the resident unresponsive at approximately 5:45 AM and notified the assigned RN. The RN assessed the resident, was unable to obtain a blood pressure, pulse, or respirations, and left the room to verify the code status in the EMR, which confirmed the resident was a DNR. Despite this, the RN called EMS and documented that she could not obtain vital signs. She later stated she thought she saw the resident take small breaths and called EMS based on a prior company policy, but could not explain the discrepancy between her observation and her documentation that respirations were absent. When EMS arrived, the RN showed them the DNR order in the EMR, and EMS requested a physical copy of the Florida DNRO form. The RN was unable to locate a paper DNRO form and instead printed the scanned hospital DNRO onto goldenrod paper. EMS determined the form was invalid because it lacked the signature of the resident or his authorized representative and therefore initiated CPR. EMS performed three rounds of CPR before discontinuing efforts and pronouncing the resident deceased at 6:40 AM. Interviews with the resident’s daughter confirmed she was his health care proxy, that she had informed facility staff of his wish to be a DNR, and that she was later told EMS performed CPR because the Florida DNRO form had not been signed. The Social Services Director and facility leadership acknowledged that staff had recognized the hospital DNRO form was incomplete prior to the event but failed to ensure a valid, signed Florida DNRO form was obtained and available, resulting in EMS performing CPR contrary to the resident’s documented DNR status. The facility’s policies for CPR and documentation required adherence to residents’ advance directives and accurate, complete documentation in the medical record. Staff interviews and the facility’s internal investigation confirmed that although the DNR order was present in the EMR and the need for a surrogate and DNR status had been identified, the Florida DNRO form remained incomplete and unsigned by the resident or his proxy at the time of the emergency. During the emergency response, the absence of a valid DNRO form led EMS to determine that CPR must be initiated. This sequence of actions and inactions—failure to complete and validate the DNRO form, lack of proper documentation of the proxy’s authorization on the DNRO, and reliance on an invalid hospital DNRO—resulted in the resident receiving CPR against his stated wishes.
Removal Plan
- Initiated an internal investigation including resident record review and staff interviews; notified the Department of Children and Families, the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, and local law enforcement; validated notification of the attending physician/medical director and the resident’s responsible party regarding the event.
- Conducted a 100% audit of all current residents’ code status and care plans; verified the presence of a valid Florida DNRO form for each applicable resident in the EMR.
- Conducted code blue drills across all shifts.
- Implemented Emergency Response Binders containing the Florida DNRO form for applicable residents, a facility Florida DNRO verification checklist, and a code status reference guide for staff; placed binders at each nurses’ station, the rehabilitation department, and the social services office.
- Provided education to licensed nurses, the Social Services Director, and the Admissions Coordinator on the location of goldenrod (yellow) paper for printing Florida DNRO forms.
- Educated staff that CPR must be initiated by EMS unless a valid Florida DNRO form is physically available.
- Established designated locations for goldenrod (yellow) paper for Florida DNRO forms to prevent delays.
- Held an Ad Hoc QAPI committee meeting to review education and audits.
- Completed a 100% chart audit of advance directives including code status, DNR orders, and Florida DNRO forms.
- Educated all licensed nurses on Resident Rights regarding Advance Directives; verification of code status and advance directives; DNR orders; Florida DNRO forms and requirements; CPR policy and EMS response requirements; communication of code status; location of goldenrod (yellow) paper for printing Florida DNRO forms; and complete and accurate documentation in the EMR; administered a post-test to ensure understanding.
- Trained all licensed nurses and had them complete post-tests; continued education to include new employees.
- Conducted Code Blue Drills with licensed nurses; scheduled remaining staff to complete a code blue drill upon return from leave.
- Held Ad Hoc QAPI meetings and a Monthly QAPI meeting with Administrator, Director of Nursing, Medical Director, and administrative staff to review and revise education, audits, code blue drills, and post-tests as indicated.
- Conducted staff interviews across all shifts to validate knowledge of advance directives, code status verification, Florida DNRO form completion, and location of Emergency Response Binders; validated education, audits, and code blue drill participation through interviews and review of attendance sheets and post-tests.
Failure to Ensure Valid DNRO Resulted in Unwanted CPR
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to honor a resident’s Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) wishes by not ensuring those wishes were completely and accurately documented to promote continuity of care between providers. The resident, an older male admitted with stroke, type 2 diabetes, essential hypertension, HIV, unspecified dementia, heart failure, coronary artery disease, renal insufficiency, and non-Alzheimer’s dementia, had a physician order for DNR in the electronic medical record (EMR). His Minimum Data Set assessment showed moderate cognitive impairment, and his care plan included impaired cognitive process with an intervention to communicate with the resident and family regarding his needs. The hospital transfer documentation (3008 form) indicated the resident was DNR, and a Florida Do Not Resuscitate Order (DNRO) form signed by the hospital physician was present in the EMR. On the night of admission, the LPN Supervisor reported that the resident was confused, so she and another nurse contacted the resident’s daughter by phone for consent to treat and to confirm his DNR status. They confirmed with the daughter that the resident’s wish was to be DNR and signed the facility’s Advance Directives Discussion Document, but they did not sign off on the Florida DNRO form. The Social Services Director (SSD) later reviewed the admission packet and noted that the Florida DNRO form was signed only by a physician and lacked any other signature. The SSD stated that she, the former DON, and the former ADON called the resident’s daughter to verify his wish not to have CPR, and confirmed that the two nurses on the call were RNs. However, the SSD could not explain why the nurses did not document this conversation, did not sign the Florida DNRO form until the resident or proxy could sign, and did not obtain the necessary signature by another means. On the morning of the resident’s death, the assigned RN reported that a CNA notified her that the resident was unresponsive at approximately 5:45 AM. The RN assessed the resident, found no blood pressure, pulse, or respirations, and confirmed in the EMR that the resident’s code status was DNR. She then called EMS and, upon their arrival, provided them with a printed copy of the Florida DNRO form, which she located on goldenrod-colored paper in the front office. EMS personnel observed that the form contained only the physician’s signature and lacked the resident’s or authorized representative’s signature, and informed the RN that the form was invalid. EMS then initiated CPR and continued until they discontinued efforts and pronounced the resident deceased. The resident’s daughter later confirmed she was his health care proxy, stated she had informed facility staff at admission that he was DNR, and was later told by facility staff that EMS performed CPR because the Florida DNRO form was not signed. The facility’s own policies required complete, accurate, and timely documentation of residents’ treatment choices and advance directives, but the necessary signatures and documentation for a valid Florida DNRO were not obtained or made available, leading to the failure to honor the resident’s DNR wishes.
Removal Plan
- Notify the attending physician, Medical Director, Administrator, interim DON and resident representative of the incident and initiate an investigation.
- Conduct an immediate 100% audit of all current residents' code status and care plan; verify the presence of a valid Florida DNRO form for each applicable resident in the EMR; confirm the form contains the physician and resident/proxy signatures, signature dates, and legal proxy authority; and contact attending physicians and legally authorized representatives to complete any missing or incomplete Florida DNRO form documentation.
- Print the Florida DNRO form for each applicable resident and place it in Emergency Response Binders.
- Place Emergency Response Binders on each unit, in the rehabilitation (therapy) room, and in social services.
- Initiate advanced directives audits weekly for three months to ensure the Florida DNRO form is complete and valid.
- Implement a revised admission/readmission process that includes Resident Rights and Advance Directive education upon admission, completion of an Advance Directives Discussion Document, and validation of advance directives by Social Services/designee.
- Provide education to licensed nurses, the Social Services Director, and the Admissions Coordinator on the location of goldenrod (yellow) paper for printing Florida DNRO forms.
- Provide education to licensed nurses, the Admissions Coordinator, and the SSD on documentation in the medical record to ensure each resident's medical record contains complete, accurate, and timely documentation.
- Educate the SSD on ensuring accuracy of advance directives and the Florida DNRO form.
- Implement a Florida DNRO form admission and readmission checklist to ensure verification of required signatures, confirmation of proxy authority, proper form completion, and physical availability of the Florida DNRO form.
- Hold an Ad Hoc QAPI committee meeting.
- Complete a 100% chart audit of advanced directives including code status, DNR orders, and Florida DNRO forms.
- Educate all licensed nurses on Resident Rights related to Advanced Directives, verification of advance directives, DNR orders, Florida DNRO forms and requirements, and complete and accurate documentation in the EMR.
- Require completion of a post-test following education to ensure understanding.
- Continue education for new employees.
- Hold Ad Hoc and monthly QAPI meetings with the Administrator, Director of Nursing, Medical Director, and administrative staff.
- Review and revise education, audits, and post-tests as indicated.
- Conduct staff interviews representing all shifts to assess knowledge of advanced directives, verification of code status, completion of the Florida DNRO form, and location of Emergency Response Binders.
Failure to Initiate CPR and Honor Full Code Status
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure that nursing staff demonstrated competency in performing CPR and honoring a resident’s full code status. The resident involved had a documented physician progress note confirming that he understood the difference between full code and DNR and elected full code status. On the night of the incident, the resident was found unresponsive and without vital signs, yet facility staff did not initiate CPR. The facility’s LPN job description required current CPR certification and outlined responsibilities including directing CNAs, complying with policies and procedures, and participating in end-of-life care, but these expectations were not met in this event. According to interviews, a CNA who was not assigned to the resident was informed by the assigned CNA that the resident was not responding and not moving. As they proceeded to the room, they encountered the LPN at the nurses’ station, notified her of the situation, and the LPN stated she was on her way but continued what she was doing. When the LPN entered the room, she applied an oximeter and obtained an oxygen saturation of 60, which she described as “kind of low.” The CNA reported telling the LPN that the resident “is not here” and asking if they needed to call a code. The LPN left the room to check the resident’s code status, returned and confirmed he was full code, but still did not initiate CPR. The CNA stated that no one called a code blue, no overhead page was made, and no staff began CPR before EMS arrived. The LPN later stated she found the resident unresponsive, with cold feet and no response to sternal rub, and that she called 911, obtained the crash cart, and asked a CNA to get another nurse. She reported that she did not start CPR because she believed the resident was already dead, said she needed a backboard and help to move the resident due to his size, and did not ask the CNAs to assist. She acknowledged that she did not call a code, did not perform compressions, and that all staff present “did not do anything” while waiting for EMS. Other nurses who responded to the room, including an RN and another LPN, stated they did not start CPR, assumed the resident was a DNR based on how the situation was presented, did not verify the code status themselves, and did not call a code blue. The RN reported that she did not initiate CPR because she assumed the resident was a DNR and was focused on the idea that she was being asked to pronounce death, and only after contacting the DON did she learn the resident was full code and was told to start CPR, at which point EMS arrived. EMS personnel questioned why CPR had not been started if the resident was full code. The medical director stated that the expectation was that immediate CPR should be started for a full code resident and that nurses are not to pronounce death or rely on signs such as cold extremities, but instead should confirm code status and initiate CPR.
Removal Plan
- Initiated an internal investigation including resident record review, staff interviews, and notifications to DCF, AHCA, and local law enforcement.
- Suspended and terminated the assigned nurse and reported the nurse’s license to the licensing board.
- Suspended and terminated two additional nurses who responded to the scene and reported their licenses to the licensing board.
- Completed a facility-wide audit of resident code status preferences and verified that orders and care plans were correct.
- Reviewed residents with Do Not Resuscitate preferences to ensure a valid Florida DNRO was physically available at the facility.
- Conducted an audit of the facility’s crash carts to ensure all required items were present.
- Held an Ad Hoc QAPI meeting with the Executive Director, Director of Clinical Services, and Medical Director.
- Placed overhead paging system instructions by telephones at the nurse’s station, reception area, and dining room with instructions on how to page overhead.
- Reviewed facility deaths to ensure residents’ advance directives were followed related to code status.
- Completed an audit of licensed nurse licensure and verified cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) cards were valid.
- Implemented a requirement that all new employees participate in a Code Blue drill upon hire.
- Implemented a requirement that licensed nursing staff sign an Honoring Advance Directive Attestation upon hire.
- Educated facility staff on Resident Rights, including the right to choose code status.
- Educated licensed staff on honoring advance directives, timeliness of initiating CPR, following physician orders, and the code blue process.
- Provided all-staff education on abuse, neglect, and exploitation.
- Provided all-staff Resident Rights education.
- Provided licensed nursing staff education on honoring advance directives, physician orders, timeliness of initiating CPR, and the code blue process.
- Conducted code blue quality assurance drills.
- Implemented a requirement that licensed nurses will not work prior to attending a mock code blue quality assurance drill.
- Conducted staff interviews to verify knowledge of facility policies regarding code status, roles during a code blue, and where to find advance directives, and confirmed staff received abuse and neglect training.
Failure to Honor Full Code Status and Initiate Timely CPR
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to honor a cognitively intact resident’s clearly documented Full Code status and to initiate CPR when the resident was found unresponsive. The resident had multiple medical diagnoses including type 2 diabetes, atrial fibrillation, abnormal gait, blindness in the right eye, shortness of breath, muscle wasting, mood disorder, and hypertension. On admission and throughout the stay, documentation in the EMR, physician orders, nursing assessments, care plan, and an APRN advance care planning note consistently identified the resident as Full Code, with the resident verbalizing understanding of Full Code versus DNR and electing Full Code. A 5‑day MDS showed intact cognition (BIMS 14), and progress notes shortly before the event documented the resident as clinically stable, at baseline, and continuing as Full Code. On the morning of the incident, a CNA assigned to the resident reported finding him unresponsive close to 6:00 a.m. and notified the LPN assigned to him. Another CNA reported being told around 5:30 a.m. that the resident was not responding and, upon entering the room, found the resident not breathing and without a pulse, partially hanging off the bed. Both CNAs described that when the LPN arrived, she checked the resident, left to obtain a pulse oximeter, returned with an oxygen saturation reading of 60, and was told by the CNA that there was no pulse and that a code should be called. The CNAs stated that the LPN delayed, left the room again to check code status, then reported the resident was Full Code, but still did not initiate CPR or call a code blue. Instead, the CNAs were sent to get another nurse from another floor, leaving the resident alone in the room during part of this time. The CNAs consistently reported that no staff initiated CPR before EMS arrived. The LPN assigned to the resident stated she found him unresponsive around 6:00 a.m., performed a sternal rub, noted he was not responding and that his feet were cold, and then left the room to call 911 from her personal cell phone and get the crash cart. She acknowledged that she did not start CPR, stating she believed the resident was already dead, that he was a large man, and that she needed a backboard and additional help to move him to the floor, but did not ask the CNAs to assist. She confirmed that no code blue was called and that no CPR was performed by facility staff. Two additional nurses who responded to the room reported they were summoned to “pronounce” a resident, assumed the resident was a DNR based on how the situation was presented, did not independently verify code status before acting, and did not initiate CPR. The RN who arrived stated she called the DON to ask what to do about pronouncing, was told the resident was Full Code and to start CPR, and that at that moment EMS arrived. EMS arrived at approximately 6:09 a.m., confirmed the resident’s Full Code status, questioned why CPR had not been started, and then initiated CPR, which continued for approximately 45 minutes before the resident was pronounced dead. Facility leadership and the Medical Director later confirmed that CPR had not been initiated by staff and that the resident’s Full Code status had not been honored, resulting in a determination of Immediate Jeopardy.
Removal Plan
- Initiated an internal investigation with resident record review, staff interviews, and notification to DCF, AHCA, and local law enforcement.
- Suspended and terminated the assigned nurse and reported the nurse’s license to the licensing board.
- Suspended and terminated two additional nurses who responded to the scene and reported their licenses to the licensing board.
- Completed a facility audit of resident code status preferences and verified that orders and care plans were correct.
- Conducted a 100% audit of the crash carts in the facility to ensure all required items were present.
- Held an Ad Hoc QAPI meeting with the Executive Director, Director of Clinical Services, and at least three other department heads.
- Reviewed facility deaths to ensure residents’ advance directives were followed related to code status.
- Implemented a requirement that licensed nursing staff sign a Honoring Advance Directive Attestation upon hire.
- Educated facility staff on Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation with emphasis on Advance Directives.
- Educated licensed staff on Honoring Advance Directives, timeliness of initiated CPR, following physician orders, and the Code Blue process.
- Provided all-staff Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation education with 100% completion.
- Provided all-staff Resident Rights education with 100% completion.
- Provided licensed nursing staff education with 100% completion on Honoring Advance Directives, Physicians Orders, timeliness of initiated CPR, and the Code Blue process.
- Conducted Code Blue quality assurance drills.
- Implemented a requirement that licensed nurses will not work prior to attending a mock Code Blue quality assurance drill.
- Interviewed staff members to confirm training and knowledge of code status policies, roles during a Code Blue, and where to find advance directives, and confirmed receipt of abuse and neglect training.
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